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Previous studies on the signaling effects of land auctions mainly focused on how land
auction affect the share prices of the winning company. However, the results of these
studies may be affected by stock market sentiment and characteristics of individual
companies. There are also problems of missing observations if the winning company is
not a listed company. To overcome these problems, we propose to examine the signaling
effect of land auction by observing how real estate price on the vicinity of the auctioned
site respond to land auction outcome. This approach is only feasible in an actively
transacted market such as the Hong Kong residential market.
Most people believe that the result of land auction would have an effect on nearby
property prices for two possible reasons. First, land auction results reflect developers’
expectation about future property prices (signaling effect hypothesis). Since developers
in Hong Kong are very large and experiences, they possess more information and
expertise and thus are believed to be able to predict future price movement more
accurately than an average individually market participant. Second, land auction is
similar to forward bulk purchase of real estate assets. The land auction price therefore
contains current price information of real estate assets (valuation effect hypothesis).
Which effect plays a more dominate role is an empirical question that has not been
investigated so far.
In this study, we examine the transaction prices of properties in the vicinity of an
auctioned site before and after the auction. Our findings suggest that land auction
IV
outcome has a positive and short-term impact on nearby property prices. The lack of a
longer term impact suggests that land auction outcome has no signaling effect. That is,
the real estate market does not perceive the winning bids containing reliable information
about future real estate prices despite the fact that most developers in Hong Kong are
very experienced and large in size and that the auctioned land have to be developed
within a relative short time horizon.
In addition, the positive, despite short term, impact suggests that the land auction is
regarded by the real estate market to be similar to forward bulk purchase real estate assets.
Therefore the outcome of land auction contains reliable current real estate price
information. The influence of such price information on valuation of real estate assets in
vicinity declines quickly over time.
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In Hong Kong, public auction, tender and private treaty grant are the three ways of
disposal of land. The HKSAR government is the sole perpetual owner of the territory
under the leasehold system. Public auctions are the most common method of sales. The
government would sell their land leases to the highest bidder at the public auction. The
winning bidder does not own the land, but actually has the exclusive private property
rights over the land for a specific period of time. (Li, 2005)
In the recent years, the economy of Hong Kong has begun its recovery and property
prices have been rising steadily. This has induced the developers to increase supply to the
residential market. Other than that, land auctions had been stopped for about 1 year, from
2002 to 2003, to restrict land supply holding the aim to boost up property prices. Land
Auctions only resumed in 2003 and today, developers are beginning to run short of land
for future development. Due to these two reasons, the performances of land auctions have
been sound in the past few years.
It is widely believed that the sound performance of a piece of land in a public auction will
cause an upturn in the residential property prices nearby. The owners who own properties
near the auctioned site will therefore increase their selling price or reduce the bargaining
margin of reduction if positive new results from a land auction. Some property owners
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even halt the sale of their flats after being informed of a land auction occurring for a site
nearby, as they believe that land selling at a high price could increase the property prices
nearby and therefore maximize the value of their property.
Most people believe that the result of a land auction can have an effect on nearby
property prices for two possible reasons. First, land auction results reflect local
developers’ expectations about future property prices (signaling effect hypothesis).
Since developers in Hong Kong are very large and experienced, they possess more
information and expertise and thus are believed to be able to predict future price
movement more accurately than an average individually market participant. Secondly,
land auction is similar to a forward bulk purchase of real estate assets. The land auction
price therefore contains the current price information of real estate assets (valuation
effect hypothesis). The result of land auction would acts as an indicator to the property
prices in the immediate district. People would also take reference from the land auction
result and make suitable adjustments to their selling prices.
This dissertation aims to study which effect plays a more dominant role in affecting the
property prices nearby, as well as offering an investigation into the phenomenon of
Winner’s curse in the land auction. The investors and property owners are not influenced




Previous studies on the signaling effects of land auctions mainly focused on how the
results from land auctions affect the share prices of the winning company. However, the
results of these studies may not be accurate for a number of reasons. Firstly, the returns of
the stocks are highly influenced by stock market sentiment. During the downside of stock
market, the positive impact induced from acquiring a land site at a favorable price may be
outweighed totally and the winning company may not experience any abnormal return.
Secondly, some developers are having a relatively high debt to equity ratio and acquiring
land site would further increase their financial burden. The company may encounter
liquidity problem after acquiring the site. Therefore, it would not be any good to some
companies even if they purchase a parcel of land site at an attractive price.
Thirdly, the size of developers would also influence the magnitude of signaling effect on
the property prices nearby. If a developer with a small market capitalization won a large
parcel of land in public auction, the market would perceive that the developer may not
have the sufficient capital and expertise to handle such a large project. The new project
may do harm to the company as they may encounter cash flow and management
problems. Last but not least, there are also problems of missing observations if the
winning company is not a listed company.
To overcome these problems, we propose to examine the signaling effect of land auction
by observing how real estate price on the vicinity of the auctioned site respond to land
auction outcome. This approach is only feasible in an actively transacted market such as




In order to achieve the goal of the study, several objectives are derived and they are as
follows:
1. To investigate whether a good performance in land auction will boost up the property
price nearby and vice versa
2. To examine the locality signaling effect and the valuation effect brought by land
auctions and to study which effect plays a more dominate role in affecting the
property prices nearby
3. To investigate whether the developers have adjusted for winner’s curse in formulating
their bidding strategy
4. To draw appropriate implication from the findings
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1.3 Structure of dissertation
Under Chapter 1, the objectives of the study are given and a brief introduction to address
the issue which will be discussed further.
Chapter 2 is a review of literatures related to event study methodology and theory of
auction. There will be a detail discussion on the characteristics of event study and its
applications in assessing the impact of certain events. Land auction is the main theme of
this study and some literatures about auction theory will also be examined in this chapter.
Chapter 3 will provide you with a critical investigation over the impact brought by the
land auction. Locality signaling effect would exert a long term impact to the property
market nearby while the valuation effect would influence the property market temporarily.
The rationale behind and degree of impacts brought to the price of properties would be
discussed under this chapter.
Chapter 4 will introduce the methodology employed in this study. This chapter would
discuss the underlying principle of repeat sales indices and its application in this
dissertation.
Chapter 5 would explain the design of this research. Time frame of this study would be
defined in this section. The methods used to measure the market return and the abnormal
return experienced by the properties nearby would be addressed in this chapter. Relative
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performance index which is used to evaluate the performance of a land auction would
also be discussed.
Chapter 6 involves the specification of models used in this study. Explanation would also
be given to the variable involved in the equations.
Chapter 7 will state the sources of data in this study. The data obtained would be used to
study the impact brought by land auction.
Chapter 8 will present a detail discussion on the empirical results of the study. The
implications from the results will be addressed in this chapter.
Finally, a conclusion would be given in chapter 9. Major limitations of this dissertation
and further studies will also be suggested.
Chapter 2 Literature Review
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1Event Study Methodology
Event study methodology is established by Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR) (1969). FFJR
studied how quickly and correctly the stock market reacted to the announcements of
stock splits. The impact of the stock splits is reflected on the stock price and the abnormal
returns are measured as residuals from some benchmark model of normal returns. FFJR
made use of the CRSP NYSE Market Portfolio to evaluate the market return and monthly
return data from 1926 to 1960 was used.
Event studies generally seek to measure abnormal security performance associated with
firm-specific events. 1
According to Binder (1998), in practice, event studies have been used for two major
reasons. First, as explained by Fama (1991) and Brown and Wamer (1980) it is used to
test the null hypothesis that the market efficiently incorporates information. Abnormal
security returns continue after certain kinds of event have occurred is inconsistent to the
market efficient hypothesis. Event study provides a tool for the researchers to investigate
the duration of time that the abnormal return persists. Stock prices adjust very rapidly to
new information under an "efficient" stock market.
1 MALATESTA, P. H. (1986) Measuring Abnormal Performance: The Event Parameter Approach Using
Joint Generalized Least Squares. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21, 27–38.
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Second, under the maintained hypothesis of market efficiency, at least with respect to
publicly available information, event study is used to investigate the impact of certain
events to the stock price of affected firms. This focused on the magnitude of abnormal
security return at the time after the event occurred.
The general procedures of an event study are summarized by Henderson (1990). The
steps are as follow:
1. Define the date upon which the market would have received the news.
2. Characterize the returns of the individual companies in the absence of this news
3. Measure the difference between observed returns and "no-news" returns for each firm,
that is the abnormal returns.
4. Aggregate the abnormal returns across firms and across time.
5. Statistically test the aggregated returns to determine whether the abnormal returns are
significant and, if so, for how long.
2.1.1 Define Event date
After identifying the event, the date on which the event occurred should also be
determined. A precise event date is critical to the event study and it enables the
researchers to define a clear and tight event window to capture the abnormal return
brought by the event. As explained by Henderson (1990), the event date used in the study
may not be the date in which the event took place. Instead, the event date should be the
date in which the market is reasonably anticipated the news and react to the new
information. In many literatures, announcement dates of the events are defined as event
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date as it is readily available in market and it is the date on which the information about
the events is formally revealed to the market. In Dielman, Nantell et al. (1980), the
announcement date of stock repurchase is defined as the event date and it can be checked
in the Wall Street Journal.
In some event studies, it is rather difficult to identify the exact date in which the
information of the event reaches market. In the event studies that investigate the impact
of new regulations to the stock market.2 Event date cannot be defined precisely as the
announcements of new regulation are normally anticipated by the market during the
discussion stage of the regulations. As suggested by Ball and Torous (1988), the event
period can be identified by a maximum likelihood procedure that incorporates the
possibility of a random event date They used maximum-likelihood method to investigate
the valuation effects of stock splits and stock dividends.
Another way to tackle this problem is to expand the event window to ensure that the
event is contained within the window. However, a longer event window would introduce
noise to the result as the number of confounding concurrent events also increases,
reducing the power of the test statistic used to capture abnormal returns. 3
2 See Binder (1983; 1985), McCubbins et al. (1987), Cross, Wallace N. Davidson et al. (1988) for studies of impact of
new regulations to the stock market
3 Mcwilliams, Siegel et al. (1999)
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2.1.2 Event window
Event window is the period of time in which the stock price is influenced by the events. 4
According to Mcwilliams, Siegel et al. (1999), there is much less deviation among studies
in the length of the event window. In the studies which investigate the impact of certain
events on stock price of some firms, event window is rarely exceeds 3 trading days. It is
because there is a vital assumption of the event study methodology that the stock market
is efficient. In an efficient market, new information is almost instantaneously
incorporated in stock prices; that is, the stock price almost immediately reflects new
information.5 A relatively long event window would make it difficult to control the effect
of the event from the effect of other events that affect a firm’s stock price. A tight and
well-defined event window would reduce the noise for the event study.
The duration of event window is curial to the design of an event study and it would
significantly affect the results of the study. The date in which the event has occurred is
defined as day 0 and most of the event studies would consider one day before and after
the event date to be the event window in which abnormal return of the targeted stocks are
examined. One day before the event date is defined as -1 and it is also included in the
event window because there may be leakage of information or the stock market can
anticipate the result of the events.
Some typical events are announcement of earnings, merger, and shareholder meetings. In
Teets (1992), a relatively longer event window is employed with 5 trading days, -4 to 0
4 Ching and Fu (2003)
5 Mitchell and Netter (1989)
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relative to the Journal publication date. A longer event window is used because it can
capture market reactions to early disclosures made during that period. In Meznar et al.
(1994; 1998), they found no significant stock price reaction during the traditional short 3-
day event window (–1, +1). Instead, they report significant results only when they
employ very long windows. The duration of event window used depend on the nature of
the event under investigation and it is also up to the choice of the researcher.
As FFJR (1969), Ball and Torous (1988) point out, if the event window is included in the
period which used to estimate the market return, the market model would be biased as the
market return would contain the effects of the event and related occurrences. Event-date
clustering occurs when the event dates for all the firms are the same or fall close
together.6
2. 1.2.1 Leakage of Information
Mcwilliams, Siegel et al. (1999) provided a clear analysis towards the problem of leakage
of information. Prior speculation regarding impending events is often regarded to as
leakage of information. Leakage makes it difficult to identify the date on which investors
were able to react to the new information. Binder (1998) explained that leakage of
information would reduce the power of the studies to reject the null hypothesis of no
effect of the event on security price. For example, in the event study which investigates
the impact of earning announcement to the company’s stock price, stock market may
reasonable foresee the result before the announcement due to the leakage of information
6 Henderson (1999)
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from some insiders such as accountants, auditors, company directors and staffs. Market
may react to the information prior to the announcement and the abnormal return
examined during the event window would be small as some of them are captured before
the announcement is made.
A. Mcwiliams and Zardkoohi (1993) investigated the effects of Supreme Court decisions
on the stock price of affected firms. There is an argument between two firms about the
mergers. They demonstrated that most of the impact on share price occurs at the time that
the case is argued, rather than when the decisions are announced. They employed event
study with a 2-days event window and the result shows that the significant effect on share
prices happened on the date of the argument, but not the date of the decision. Market can
reasonable foresee the decision of Supreme Court as the argument proceeds and the
investors would capitalize the abnormal return prior to the announcement of decision
made my Supreme Court.
2.1.3 Estimation Window
During the estimation window, market or normal returns for each firm are estimated and
they are defined as the expected normal return for each firm during the event window.
During the estimation window, the normal returns for the samples are found and they
should be controlled for any other confounding events. 7There are three choices for the
estimation window: before the event window and during the event window, after the
7 MCWILLIAMS, A., SIEGEL, D. & TEOH, S. H. (1999) Issues in the Use of the Event Study
Methodology: A Critical Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility Studies. Organizational Research
Methods, 2, 340-365.
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window. The most common choice, when feasible, is using the period before the event
window for the estimation window. FFJR (1969), Brown and Warner (1980) pointed out
that if the event window is included in the estimation period, the normal return estimated
during the estimation window would be biased as it would be influenced by the impact
of the event.
Henderson (1990) summarized how the researchers position the estimation window if
different market model are used. The mean-adjusted returns model normally involves
estimation before the event window and the mean return referred to is the company's
average return before the event. For Market-adjusted returns and risk-adjusted return,
estimation of market return was carried out during the event window. It is because the
event may fundamentally vary the firms' sensitivity to market returns. If the event is
strong enough to change alpha and beta of the firm, then it is not appropriate to estimate
the market return before the event window. The control portfolio approach also involves
estimation during the event window, but construction of the control portfolio normally
can be based on data before or after the event window.
2.1.4 Measuring abnormal return
Central to an event study is the measurement of an abnormal stock return. The abnormal
return is the difference between the observed return of the security over the event window
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and the normal return of the firm over the event window. The normal return of a firm can
be estimated using different market models which would be discussed later. 8
According to Brown and Warner (1980), the return of security i in period t is given by
itR and the model used to generate the abnormal return is as follow:
ititit AKR 
, where itK , is the expected return generated by a particular market model, itA represents
the abnormal return of security i in period t.
2.1.5 Market model
In order to control for the influences on the stock price of affected firms due to factors
other than the impact of the event, the normal return for the stock during the event
window is estimated. The normal return is defined as the expected return without
conditioning on the event taking place.9 There are a number of ways for characterizing a
firm's normal returns. Some of the more popular include: mean returns, market returns,
control portfolio returns, and risk-adjusted returns.10
2.1.5.1 Mean returns model
8 MACKINLAY, A. C. (1997) Event Studies in Economics and Finance. Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 13-39.
9 MACKINLAY, A.C. (1997) Event Studies in Economics and Finance. Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 13-39.
10BROWN, S. J. & WARNER, J. B. (1980) Measuring Security Price Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 8,
205–258
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Mean returns model can also be called as Mean-adjusted returns model. As explained by
Brown and Warner (1980), the Mean Adjusted Returns model assumes that the ex ante
expected return for a given security i is equal to a constant iK which can differ across
securities. The predicted ex post return on security i in time period t is equal to iK . The
abnormal return itA is equal to the difference between the observed return, itR , and the
predicted return iK :
itA = itR - iK
In this approach, the stock price is assumed to generate the same return that it averaged
during the estimation period. In another words, the mean adjusted return can be obtained
by deducting the average return for stock during the estimation period from the stock’s
return in the event window.
This approach is having the advantage that it involves simple calculation since only one
parameter is used and the estimation of market return is not required. However, this
method does not explicitly control for the risk of the stock or the return on the market
portfolio during event window. When the market return during the event window is
greater (less) than its expectation, the presumed market return which is based on the
average return of targeted stock during the estimation window will be positively
(negatively) biased . Hence, the abnormal return would be smaller if the market return
during the event window is greater than its expectation. 11
11 Binder (1998)
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Moreover, the impacts of some events may alter the underlying risk of the firm and its
market return would change accordingly. The presumed market return which is obtained
by averaging the return in estimation period would be biased if the underlying risk of the
firms is changed due to the impact of the event. In Galai and Masulis (1976), they
demonstrates that a merger may vary the underlying risk of a stock of the acquiring firm
and this would contribute biased to the study if mean return model are used.
2.1.5.2 Market returns model
Market returns model are also known as Market-adjusted returns model. As explained by
Brown and Warner (1980), market-adjusted return of a security equals to the difference
between its return and that on the market portfolio;
itA = itR – mtR
,in which mtR represents the return on market portfolio in time t. In this approach, a
company, in the absence of news, is assumed to generate the same returns as the rest of
the market during the event window.12 Market portfolios used are generally the return of
some market indexes like DJ industrial and S&P 500 in which they represents the general
market return for stocks. In Gilligan and Krehbiel (1988), the value-weighted market
portfolio of all stocks traded on the New York and American Stock Exchanges was used
as benchmark for evaluating abnormal return of stocks subject to the impact of energy tax
legislation.
12 HENDERSON, G. V. (1990) Problems and Solutions in Conducting Event Studies. The Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 57, 282-306.
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The market-adjusted return model is quite straight-forward and readily applicable.
Market portfolios such as market index portfolio are used to act as the benchmark to
estimate the market adjusted returns of the targeted stock. This method controls for the
risk of the targeted stock and the movement of the market during the event window.
Moreover, this approach is helpful when there are no data prior to the event, as, for
example, in the case of initial public offering13. However, this approach does not handle
calendar clustering well.14
2.1.5.3 Control portfolio returns model
It is established by Brown and Warner (1980) and it is simplified by Henderson (1990).
In this approach, the researchers need to construct a control portfolio in which the
selected companies are similar to the sample firms except for the absence of news about
the firms in the control portfolio. The firms in the control portfolio might be in the same
industry as the sample firms or they might be of the same risk. Abnormal return is then
defined as the difference between the observed return of the sample firm and the return of
the control portfolio during the event window. The drawback of this approach is that it is
rather difficult to construct a control portfolio which are having the same risk and return
as that of the sample firms.
2.1.5.4 Risk-adjusted returns model
13 CHALK, A. J. & PEAVY, J. W. (1987) Initial Public Offerings: Daily Returns, Offering Types And The Price Effect
Financial Analysts Journal, 43, 65-69.
14 HENDERSON, G. V. (1990) Problems and Solutions in Conducting Event Studies. The Journal of Risk
and Insurance, 57, 282-306.
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According to Brown and Warner (1980), this model relied on certain kinds of regression
models to generate the expected return for stocks. This idea is furthered elaborated by
Binder (1998). He suggested that two famous equilibrium models can be used. The first
one is the Sharpe (1964)–Lintner (1965) Capital Asset Pricing Model or the Black (1972)
CAPM. The second one is the multifactor model, such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
(APT)15. Abnormal returns are then defined to be the difference between the returns
observed and those predicted by the regression model.
2.1.6 Application of event study
Event studies have widely been used in various disciplines including accounting (Ball,
1990), economics, and finance to examine security price behavior around events. The
events include announcements of quarterly earnings (Patell, 1976), mergers and
acquisitions(Schipper and Thompson, 1983), change in money supply (Santomero, 1991),
legislation and regulatory changes (Binder, 1983; Schwert, 1981; Prager, 1989) and
other economically relevant events. The effect of interest changes was done by Flannery
and James (1984) in which they found that stock price movements were significantly
related to changes in interest rates by using stocks of actively traded commercial banks.
Teets(1992) conducted an event study of the announcement of earning to the stock price
of electric utilities. Dielman, Nantell et al.(1980) employed event study to examine the
effect of corporate stock repurchasing on stock market. Moreover, Event study provides
concrete evidence in testing market efficient hypothesis.
15 ROSS, S. (1977) The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing. Journal of Economic Theory, 13, 341–
360.
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Koh and Venkatraman (1991)conducted an event study of the announcement of joint
ventures on the market value of parent firms in the information technology sector. The
benefits accruing via joint ventures can be organized into the following four categories:
(1) Economies of scale accrue through partners combining distinct activities under one
entity (2) accessible to partner’s complementary assets (3) Sharing of risk (4) Shaping the
scope and basis of competition. They defined the day in which the joint venture appeared
in the Wall Street Journal as event day t = 0. The trading day prior to that day was
numbered as t=-1 and the trading day after the event day was defined as t=+1.
The impact of the announcement on the security's price was measured over the event
window with Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index as
benchmarking. The null hypothesis was rejected at the 0.01 level of significance which
indicate the impact of joint venture would significantly affect the stock price. They
carried out their investigation further to study the effect of different types of joint
ventures. In some occasions, joint ventures would allow their parent firms to expand into
new markets of the parents' existing businesses if the firms engaged in joint venture are
doing different type of business. The study found that there will be value added on the
market values of the parent firms if the joint ventures reinforce existing product-market.
However, there will be no considerable increase in market values if the firms enter new,
unrelated product-market.
In the majority of applications, event studies are employed to study the impact of certain
events to the price of common stock of affected firms. It rarely applied to the property
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market to investigate the change in property price subject to the impact of certain events.
Event study is very useful in isolating irrelevant events so that the impact of the target
event on the price of certain type of assets can be investigated.
Most of the studies which investigated the effect of certain events on the price of
residential property made use of hedonic pricing model. A common way is to insert time
dummy variables are into the model and the magnitude of impact can be observed from
the size of coefficient of time dummy variables. It is different from the traditional event
study methodology (FFJR) which makes use of the market model to evaluate the
abnormal return brought by the event under investigation.
The event can be a natural disaster (Eves, 2002; Holyway and Burby, 1990; Murdoch et
al, 1993) or environmental pollution (Bible et al, 2002; Gamble and Dowing, 1982;
Reichert, 1997). Those adverse impacts brought by disasters or pollution are long lasting
and they would definitely exert negative impact on the property prices. Apart from that,
some event studies may examine the incidents which are created manually. There have
been few attempts such as those by Chau (1997), He et al (1998), Lai, Chau et al.(2006),
Tse and Webb(2004), to estimate the impact of exogenous events such as political
instability, financial crisis or severe diseases to the overall real estate property market.
2.2. Auction Theory
Auctions are very important in daily life and it constitutes an effective way in allocating
limited resources. According to McAfee and McMillan (1987), an auction is a market
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institution with a set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of
bids from the market participants. The set of rules may restrict participation from bidders
such as imposing reserve price in the auction (Cassady, 1967), restricting the number of
bids submitted by the buyers (Shubik, 1983) and charging bidders an entry fee in order to
participate in the auction (French and McCormick, 1984). According to Cassady (1967)
and Wilson (1967), auctions are used in the selling of goods when the value of the item is
uncertain. For example, in the auction of antiques, the underlying value of a piece of
antique is unknown to every buyer and the seller. Antique is a kind of art product and
there is no standard value. Potential buyers submit their bid based on their valuations on
that item, so the reservation price of each bidder is different. McAfee and McMillan
(1987) proposed that the diversity of valuations made by bidders are not resulted from
inherent differences in the bidder’s taste, instead, it arises because each bidder having
access to different information about the true value of the item. In addition, Kagel (2002)
pointed out that auction would provide a mechanism in which the interested parties
submit their bids to price the item in absence of middleman.
2.2.1 Basic model of auction
As explained by McAfee and McMillan (1987), auctions can be categorized into two
types, private-value auction and common value auction. In private value auction, each
bidder knows his or her own reservation price only and their valuations are independent
among the bidders. In common value auction, the true value of the item is the same to
every bidder, but bidders have get access to different information about the underlying
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value of the item and it would result a different estimates among bidders.
Klemperer(1999) raised an example for illustration. In the auction of oil lease, the value
of the lease depends on how much oil is under the ground and the true value of the lease
is said to be $8million. The true value of oil lease is the same for all the bidders which are
$8 million, but it is unknown to all participants. Bidders made their respective bids based
on the information they received towards the true value of the lease. Different bids were
submitted by the bidders as they have accessed to different geological ‘signals’about the
amount of oil lying underground. If one of the bidders learnt another bidder's valuation or
preference accidentally, the bidder would probably change his valuation as learning
someone else's valuation provides useful information towards the underlying value of the
oil lease. On the other hand, if the auction is a private-value auction, the bidder would not
change his valuation as he has his own valuation towards the oil lease.
2.2.2 Auctioning methods
There are mainly four types of auctions, English auction, Dutch auction, first-price sealed
bid auction and second-price sealed bid auction. McAfee and McMillan (1987) provided
a detail discussion on all the four type of auctions. In the ascending price or English
auction, the sale is conducted by an auctioneer who starts by calling out a low price and
raises it in small increments. The auctioneer would increase the price successively until
only one bidder remains. In this auction, the price rises continuously with bidders
gradually quit the auction. When a buyer thinks that the price is too high, he signals that
he is no longer interested by lowering his hand. Once a buyer has dropped out the auction,
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he is not permitted to re-enter the auction. The auction ends when only one bidder
remains and he wins the auction with the price equal to the amount at which the second-
last bidder dropped out. The auction can also be conducted by having the seller announce
the price, or by having the bidders call out the prices themselves, or by having bids
submitted electronically with the best current bid posted. Antiques and artwork are
normally be sold by this method. The essence feature of the English auction is that, at any
point in time, every bidder knows the level of the current best bid.
Dutch auction or descending auction is the conserve of the English auction. In Dutch
auction, the auctioneer calls an initial high price so that presumably no bidder is
interested in buying the item at that price, and then lowers the price gradually until one
bidder accepts the current price. He would win the item at that price. The Dutch auction
is used in selling cut flowers in the Netherlands, fish in Israel, and tobacco in Canada.
The remaining two auctions are conducted in sealed environment. In first-price sealed bid
auction, each potential buyer submits their bid independently in sealed envelopes and the
highest bidder is awarded the object for the price he bid. With the second price sealed bid
auction, potential buyers submit a bid in sealed envelopes and the highest bidder would
win the item but pays a price equal not to his own bid but to the second-highest bid. This
auction can also be called as Vickrey auction as Vickrey (1961) who wrote a paper on
this auction. The main difference between the first-price sealed-bid auction and the
English auction is that bidders are able to observe their rival's bids in the English auction,
and accordingly, if they choose, revise their own bids. But in the sealed-bid auction, each
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bidder can submit only one bid and they cannot do any alterations after they have
submitted the bids.
2.2.3 Revenue-Equivalence Theorem
Revenue-Equivalence Theorem is developed by Myerson (1981) and Riley and
Samuelson (1981). They showed that the phenomenon recognized by Vickrey (1961;
1962) was very general. In the theorem, it proposed that for the benchmark model, any
auction mechanism would yield the same expected revenue. Under certain conditions, the
auctioneer would receive the same revenue disregard the auctioning methods. This
principle provides guideline on how to run an optimal auction. 16
2.2.4 Benchmark Model
Revenue-Equivalence Theorem applies under certain conditions. Those conditions would
constitute a benchmark model which is the easiest to analyze. The four assumptions are
as follow17:
16 BULOW, J. & ROBERTS, J. (1989) The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions. Jounral of Political
Economy, 97, 1060-90.
17 KRISHNA, V. (2002) Auction theory, San Diego, Academic Press.




3. No Budget constraints
4. Symmetry
Firstly, the model assumes that all bidders are risk neutral and they would seek to
maximize their expected profit. Klemperer (1999) explained that Risk aversion has no
impact on the bidder’s bidding strategy in second price auction. However, risk aversion
will cause the bidders to bid more aggressively in first price auction. It is because a
slightly increase in a player’s bid would slightly increase his chance of winning with a
cost of slightly decreasing the value of winning. It would be desirable for a risk-averse
bidder if the current bidding level was optimal for a risk-neutral bidder in a first-price
auction. In another words, the rise-averse bidder are buying insurance against the
possibility of losing by bidding higher.
Secondly, each player’s private information and the valuation towards the object are
independent from each other. Myerson (1981) illustrates an example to show that if the
bidder’s private information is correlated and fully public, the seller can construct an
auctioning mechanism which make himself benefits from the entire social surplus.
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Thirdly, the model assumed that the bidders are facing no budget constraints. That is the
bidders are able to pay the seller up to the amounts equal to their values. 18Lastly, the
values of all bidders are assumed to be distributed according to the same distribution
function. Vickrey (1961) illustrated that asymmetries among bidders may cause
inefficient allocation in first-price auction. Second-price auction is believed to be more
efficient in allocation and this would violate the revenue equivalence principle. 19
McAfee and McMillan (1987), Krishna (2002) and Klemperer (1999) provided a detail
analysis on how the revenue equivalence principle is affected if some of these
assumptions are relaxed.
2.2.5 Winner’s Curse
Winner’s curse is a unique phenomenon in common value auction. Capen, Clapp et al.
(1971) illustrate the presence of winner’s curse as an empirical fact by using an auction
for offshore oil drilling leases. Suppose there is an auction for the drilling rights to a
parcel of land, many oil companies are interested in it. It is assumed that the drilling right
are worth the same to all the bidders, say $8 million. Companies would estimate the
amount of oil under the parcel of land and make their respective bids. The estimations
made by various companies would differ substantially, some are too high and some are
too low. Finally, under this common value auction, it would occur that the firm that wins
18 See YEON-KOO CHE & GALE, I. (1998) Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
Review of Economic Studies 65, 1-21.
19 Marshall et al. (1994) studied the bidding strategies in an asymmetric auction.
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the auction will be the one who has the highest estimate on the value of the right. The
winning of the auction may convey bad news to the winner, it is because it implies that
the other bidders are having a lower estimate. The winner is probably over-estimating the
value of the right, leading to a negative rate of return. A failure to foresee this effect and
take it fully into consideration when deciding bidding strategy will result in what has
been called the winner’s curse.
Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) conducted the first experiment demonstrating a
winner’s curse. The items being auctioned off were 4 jars of commodities, each
containing coins and paper clips. Unknown to the subjects, each jar had a value of $8. A
total of 48 auctions were conducted, 4 in each 12 classes. Subjects submitted sealed bids
and they were told that a prize of $2 was given for the closest estimate to the true value in
each auction.
The average value estimate across all four commodities was $5.13 ($2.87 below the true
value). As pointed out by the author, this under-estimation would reduce the likelihood
and magnitude of the winner’s curse. Nevertheless, the average winning bid was $10.1,
producing an average loss to the winning bidder of $2.01.
According to Wilson (1977), a rational bidder in a common-value auction would take the
winner’s curse into account and makes his valuation not only on his own estimate of the
item's worth, but also on the presumption that he has the highest estimate. He would then
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reduce his bid in order to prevent himself from being the victim of winner’s curse. As
suggested by Hansen and John R. Lott (1991), the likelihood that a bidder will suffer the
winner's curse increases with the number of bidders that he outbids. As Capen, Clapp et
al.(1971) pointed out, “if one wins a tract against two or three others he may feel fine
about his good fortune. But how should he feel if he won against 50 others?”. This
suggested that as the number of bidders increase, the chance that if you win, you would
have over-estimated the item also increase. This implied that you should bid less
aggressively as the number of bidders increases. Winner’s curse would not occur if all the
bidders are rational. 20
Thiel (1988) explained that one of the difficulties in testing winner’s curse is that the
winner is cursed relative to the true value of the item at auction. However, in most cases,
the true value of the item is difficult to estimate and thus the negative impact brought by
winner’s curse on the winner is also hard to determine.
2.2.6 Number of bidders in auction
There is a large volume of theoretical literatures addresses the relationship between the
number of bidders and the winning price at auction21. Vickrey (1961) attempted to show
that the winning price would increase with the number of bidders under a set of strong
assumptions. Holt (1979), Harris and Raviv (1981) pointed out that increasing the
20 Cox and Isaac (1984), Thaler (1988)
21 See Vickey (1961), Milgrom (1981), McAfee and McMillan (1987)
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number of bidders increases the revenue on average of the seller. The rationale behind is
explained by Holt (1979), if there is only one bidder in the auction, he would probably
bid the lowest possible valuation in order maximize his profit. If the number of bidders is
finite, the winning bidder still can win the item at price lower than his valuation and he
would earn a positive economic rent. However, if the bidders are under perfect
competition, all the gains from trade would go to the seller. As the number of bidders
approaches infinity, the winning price would tend to the winner’s own valuation,
reducing his economic rent. Saidi and Marsden (1992) found that the average bid size
increases with the number of bidders in the auction for outer-continental offshore oil
leases.
All in all, in an English auction, every bidders need to consider two factors and they work
in opposite directions. An increase in the number of other bidders implies that to win the
auction you must bid more aggressively. However, at the same time, their presence also
increases the chance that if you win, you have over-estimated the value of item, suffering
from winner’s curse. This suggested that you should bid less aggressively. Thaler (1988)
pointed out that solving for the optimal bid is not trivial.
2.2.7 Land auctions
Land auction is a common type of land disposal method used by HKSAR government. It
is conducted in form of English Auction and the winner will be the one who has
submitted the highest bid. The developers which have access to different market
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information towards the development potential of the land would have different estimates
on the value of the land. As explained by Tse (2000), the estimations made by developers
may be highly influenced by the prevailing market sentiments. During the period when
the real estate prices are soaring, the optimistic market sentiment may encourage the
bidders to bid more aggressively against each other. He proposed that if all developers
have similar view on development value of the land, the winner must be the one with the
lowest cost estimate, or if all have similar cost estimates, the winner must be the one with
the highest estimate on the development value of the land.
Literatures which investigate the impact of land auctions are thin. Ching and Fu (2003)
and Tse (2000) study the impact of land auctions to the share prices of the winning
companies. Ching and Fu (2003) adopted event study methodology to examine the
abnormal return on the developer’s stock after he won a parcel of land in public auction
at a price below its fair market value. Their purpose is to test the contestability of the
urban land market. They show that the expected abnormal return increase with the site
value and the government land disposal level but decrease with the property market
liquidity.
In a normal event study, three day event window would be employed (-1, +1). In Ching
and Fu (2003), they expanded the event window to include the day before the auction and
3 days after. In order to control for the influences on the auction winner’ stock price due
to factors other than the expected economic profit from land acquisition, return of market
portfolio (the Hang Seng Index) is used to estimated the normal return during the event
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window. Abnormal return of a stock is defined as the difference between the actual return
and the market return.
In their study, it is worthwhile to note that positive abnormal returns of the winner’s stock
are also found on the day before the auctions. This suggested that the stock market may
foresee the auctions winners and the likely intensity of competition in the auctions.
The effect of starting bid
Ching and Fu (2003) pointed out that starting bid is a condition of auction. Market for
larger and expensive site sites is believed to be thinner and less contestable due to credit
constraints. The expected abnormal return associated with winning a more valuable site is
believed to be higher and they make use of the starting bid as an indicator for credit
constraints.
The effect of market liquidity
In addition, they proposed that low liquidity in property market would reduce the
abnormal return associated with the stock price of winning company. Low liquidity on
market would slow down the sale of completed building and this would harm the revenue
of the developers and their capacity to acquire land site in auction. They use the ratio of
the number of registered property transactions in each month to its moving average in the
past 24 months to measure market liquidity.
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The effect of the size of a developer
The size of a developer is measured by its stock market capitalization. It would affect the
abnormal return in two ways. First, the abnormal-return on stock would be smaller in
magnitude, holding the economic profit from acquiring land constant, the larger is the
capitalization of the winning developer. Second, it is due to the adverse signaling effect.
It is believed that large developers can acquire land from sources other than auction at
more favorable price. Therefore, developers’active bidding at public land auctions would
implies that they lack of more rewarding land assembly opportunities elsewhere. This
would negatively affect the stock price. It is believed that adverse signaling effect would
be stronger when the major developers actively bid for less valuable site.
Tse (2000) examines the effect of prevailing market sentiments in real estate markets on
the outcomes of real estate auctions in Hong Kong. He pointed out that the outcome of
land auctions can be viewed as mixed fortunes to the shareholders of the companies. On
one hand, the success in acquiring a parcel of land in auction implies that the developer
has won a project with positive rate of return and the stock price of the developers should
rise. Developers appraise a parcel of land based on their estimate of potential costs and
profits. Developers may have different estimates towards the land value as they perceive
different market information towards the development potential of a parcel of land. The
complexity of estimating the development costs may result the developers to arrive at
different estimates and thereby different bids. A parcel of land has no standard value. The
bidding behavior of the players would also be influenced by prevailing market sentiments
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in the real estate markets. As a result, the successful bidder may be the victim of the
“winner’s curse”. In this case, the developers probably over-estimated the value of land
and the stock market should view this as a factor that negatively affects the stock price of
the developer. Other than that, Tse (2000) has also studied the effect of various bidding
strategies on the outcome of land auction
Effect of Valuation Uncertainty
Firstly, the developers would reduce their bids as valuation uncertainty increase. They do
so in order to prevent him from being the victim of winner’s curse. Secondly, a parcel of
land is a call option with buildings as the underlying assets. An increase in uncertainty
about the future development value of the land would lead to a higher land value, which
would bring the developers to submit a higher bid. These two concepts are acting in
opposite way. If the winner’s curse dominates, the valuation uncertainty would be
negatively correlated with the optimal bids submitted by developers. If the option pricing
effect dominates, a positive correlation would be resulted. Tse (2000) used the coefficient
of variation which is computed as the ratio of standard deviation to the mean of the
market forecasts to measure the valuation uncertainty.
Effect of joint bidding:
Joint bidding is an important stargety used by small developers as they don’t have
sufficient fund to acquire a valuable site for development. There is no denying that joint
bidding would reduce competition and thereby reduce the optimal bids. However,
DeBrock and Smith (1983) have a view that joint bidding allows the bidders to pool their
Chapter 2 Literature Review
Page | 34
private information of an item with an unknown value and hence generate more accurate
estimates on the true value of the item. This would induce them to bid more aggressively
in the auction as they can estimate the true value with greater certainty. Tse (2000) used
the number of bidders in the winning bid to measure the degree of joint bidding.
Effect of Competition
In general, the expected winning bid increases with the number of bidders in an auction.22
Tse (2000) used the number of bids an auction takes to reach the winning bid from the
starting bid to measure the bidding competitiveness.
22 RILEY, J. G. & SAMUELSON, W. F. (1981) Optimal Auctions. American Economic Review, 71, 381-
92
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Chapter 3 The impact of land auction
3.1 Public Land auction of Hong Kong
Public land auction, tender and private treaty grant are the three basic land disposal
methods used by HKSAR government. Land disposal presents significant contribution to
the revenue of the SAR government annually. This kind of revenue is recognized as a
non-recurrent source of income as the amount depends greatly on the condition of
property market. The first government land auction took place on 22 January 1844 and it
continues to act as the major source of land disposal mechanism.
3.1 Process of land auction
Public auction in Hong Kong is conducted in form of an English auction with the
auctioneer announcing the starting price. There would be a standard bid size for
developers and they would call out their price according to the bid size. The price would
increase successively with increasing bid price from bidders. Bidders drop out of the
auction if the current price is greater than their reservation price. The auctioneer would
reduce the bid size if the price reached a certain high level. The land leases would
therefore be sold to the highest bidder.
3.1.1 Starting price
This is the price which is announced by the auctioneer in the beginning and it is estimated
by the government officers. According to Ching and Fu (2003), the starting price acts as a
barrier to restrict the entry of small developers to participate in land auction. It is because
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for some large and valuable land sites, the starting price would be very high. Small
developers with limited capital may not be able to acquire such valuable land site for
development. This would reduce the competition of the auction and the expected revenue
generated from acquiring the site would be higher. The small developers may form
venture to tackle the liquidity problem and this would also diversify the risk of
development among themselves.
3.1.2 Reservation price
To prevent from selling the land at a price far below market value, government would
include a confidential reservation price to a parcel of land. The auction would be void if
the ending price is below the reservation price set by the government. The table below
shows the details of land auctions which are being withdrawn. Those lands are proved
unattractive to the developers or alternatively their starting price is too high. If the land
auctions are cancelled, a serious adverse impact would be brought to the overall property
market and to the properties nearby. It is because the cancellation of auction would
reflect that the developers are uncertain about the future and the development potential of
the district is low.
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The land sites which are being withdrawn in land auction during 01/95-07/07
Date Site Location Use of land
25/01/1995 Fanling C
22/02/1995 Lam Lok Street, Sheung
Yuet Road
C
22/02/1995 On Lai Street,On Ping
Street, Shatin
C




14/03/1995 Cha Kwo Ling C
14/03/1995 Sheung Yuet Road,
Wang Chiu Road
I/C
Table 1. The land sites which are being withdrawn in land auction during 01/95-07/07
Source: Local newspapers
3.1.3 Identity of winner
The identity of the winners is also important to the study as they may influence the
market response to the result of land auction. The market may have different
interpretations towards the land auctions results if the winners are certain developers of a
certain scale. Some well known developers such as Sino group always possess an
optimistic view towards the future prospect of the property market and thus, they are
willing to pay an above market price to purchase lands. Sino Group is also known as the
most frequent and aggressive bidder in the public land auction. The property prices
nearby would not rise significantly even if those developers win the auctions at an over-
market price.
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Moreover, the market scale of the winner may also affect the magnitude of impact to the
neighboring property price resulted from land auction. Large and transitional developers
such as Sun Hung Kei properties Ltd, Henderson Land Development Company Ltd and
Cheung Kong Group, are having a sound reputation in their property developments. If
they win a parcel of land at an above market price, this would greatly strengthen the
confident of the market and boost the property price nearby. Large developers are
expected to bring a stronger positive impact to the property price nearby compared with
that of the small developers. People would be more greatly influenced as the dominant
property suppliers are optimistic towards the future and they are willing to spend an over
market price to purchase the land.
However, the identities of the winners are not easily to be found and the reason being that
it is a usual practice for the developers to set up a new limited company to participate in
the auctions. Many developers bid for land using smaller limited companies as a cover-up,
and they would inject capital to finance the whole project. This can minimize the risk to
the mother company as the newly set up company has limited liability. The mother
company would not be affected even if there was a liquidity problem in the subsidiary
company. In those newspaper articles, the identity of the winners are confirmed and
reported when the representatives of the winners voice out their opinion towards future
development of the lands.
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3.2 Regular land sale
Regular land sale is a traditional form of land disposal mechanism and it has been
suspended in the recent years. Under regular land sale, government would announce the
schedule of land sale on March. Three to four parcel of land sites would be sale in an
auction date and the auction date would normally spaced out between two to three
months. However, due to the downside property market, the regular land sale had been
suspended in late 2002 as many land sites were being withdrawn from the auction.
Regular land sale has the advantage that the developers and the public are certain about
the future land supply as the schedule of land sale is announced in the beginning of each
financial year and they can plan their investment decisions accordingly.
Revenue from land disposal is regarded as non-recurrent income and it provides financial
support to government expenditure. As seen from the charts below, revenue generated
from land disposal accounts for over 5% of the total revenue of the government in the
past 10 years. Out of the revenue generated from land disposal, revenue from public land
auction account for the major proportion.
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Figure 1. Revenue generated from land disposal in between 96-07
Source: Census and Statistics Department of HKSAR
Moreover, revenue generated from regular land sale is more stable relative to that under
application list system. It is because land auctions would be conducted regularly and
there would be income generated from land sale to HKSAR government. In contrast,
under land application system, the government may not receive any income from land
sale if the developers are lack of incentive to trigger a land auction.
3.3 Application List System
3.3.1 Background
The property market was strongly affected as the result of the Asian Financial Crisis in
1997. In 1999, the government of HKSAR introduced a new procedure for land sales by
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application in order to prevent land sale at below market price. This system made use of a
land application list and the new system aim to stabilize the property market and increase
flexibility of the land disposal system to meet the market demand. Every year, the Lands
Department will announce details of the land application list in March and the land lists
would include different type of lands to meet the market demand. The Application List
contain information on lot number, location, use, site area and the estimated earliest
available date for each of the sites.
3.3.2 Process of land application23
Potential buyers who are interested in any of the land listed can contact the government.
Buyers need to make an offer to the targeted land and the land would then be triggered
for auction or tender if the buyer submitted a price greater than or equal to the
government’s undisclosed reserve price. The applicant is also required to place a certain
amount of deposit to the government upon successful application and the deposit would
normally equal to a certain percentage of the minimum price submitted by the applicant.
An agreement is also signed between the government and the applicant stating that if the
lot is offered for sale at public auction and there is no bid in an amount equivalent to or
more than minimum price, the deposit shall be forfeited.
The auction of that land will then be announced immediately to attract other potential
buyers. During the auction, interested parties would submit their bids according to their
budget and the highest bidder would win the land. If the purchaser is not the land
applicant, the deposited will return in full to the applicant, but without interest.
23 More detail can be found in Appendix 1
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3.3.3 First modification24
The system was subjected to criticisms from the lack of transparency. Many applications
were rejected since the submitted price was lower than that of the undisclosed reserve
price and the developers criticized the government of setting an over market price. As a
result, the government reviewed the system and made certain amendments on June 2005.
Those measures include:
(a) The applicant is required to send in the application form together with a deposit
and the completed Agreement
(b) The number of Government Gazette notices is reduced from 3 to 2;
(c) The amount of deposit at 10% of the 'minimum price' submitted by the applicant,
subject to a maximum of $50 million; and
(d) If the minimum price submitted by the applicant is 80% or more of our assessed
Open Market Value (OMV) for a site in the Application List (i.e. within a 20%
margin below the OMV), this will be accepted as a trigger to initiate an auction or
tender of that site. It must be emphasized that under this arrangement, there will
also be an undisclosed reserve price below which the site will not be sold.
The (a) and (b) aim to shorten the whole process, from 10 weeks to about 7 weeks. The
major alteration is item (d) which enabled the applicant to trigger the land for auction at a
price 80% of the government undisclosed reserve price. In this new system, government
24 The details of the first and second modifications are based on the information provided by Lands
Department of HKSAR
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would valuate the land again on the auction or the tender date and the result would be
used as reserve price in the auction or tender. The government will only sell if the
bidding meets or exceeds that reserve price. This can prevent the government from
selling the land below market price. Since November 2002, Application List System
replaced the auction approach as the major means of land disposal.
3.3.4 Second modification
In March 2007, the government lowered down the deposit required to 5% of the
“minimum price” submitted by the applicant and allowed the applicant to use bank
guarantee as security with the intention to stimulate the developers to make land
application.
3.3.5 Advantage of application system
The government believes that this demand-driven application list system is very suitable
for Hong Kong property market. The developers would apply for the lands which are
under certain use are facing strong market demand. Moreover, this system also ensures
that land sites under auction would not be sold at a price far below market value. It is
because the site land being applied for sale is believed to be under strong market demand.
Government introduced this new system with the intention to increase the transparency of
the government operation and to demonstrate that the government would not intervene
with the market.
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3.3.6 Disadvantage of application system
However, this system created uncertainty for the developers, especially the small ones, as
they cannot forecast the amount of land sites available in the market. As a result, it is
difficult for them to plan their investment strategies ahead.
Moreover, under application list system, the one who applied the land site to trigger land
auction would not gain any benefits during auction. There is no guarantee that the land
site would be sold to the applicant or the land site would be sold to him at a discount to
compensate his effort in making application. There are a number of cases that the winner
is not the one who trigger the land sale. Applicant’s effort in making application would
not be compensated and the deposit would be returned to the applicant without interest.
In addition, the application made by developers would be rejected if their valuation
towards the land site is below government’s undisclosed reserve price. For example, for a
parcel of land which is located in Homantin, 19 applications towards it have been
rejected up to January of 2008. All these would reduce the incentive of the developers to
apply for land under this system.
3.3.7 Comparison between the two systems
The major difference between the two systems is that the government plays a different
role in these two systems. Under regular land sale, the government is active in nature and
she acts as the sole land supplier. She can adjust the schedule of land sale to control the
property market indirectly or to act as an alternative tool to achieve her planning strategy.
But for application list system, the government is rather passive and her monopoly power
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of land supplier is reduced under this system. She can only adjust the land application list
to control the supply indirectly, but the choice of application to trigger land auction is still
up to the developers to decide. Therefore, the developers can restrict the land supply to
boost sale by not making application to trigger land sale.
3.3.8 Development of Hong Kong land auction
Figure 2. Development of Hong Kong land auction
3.4 Signaling effect
As explained by Tse (2000), government land auctions in Hong Kong often serves as a
vehicle for the developers to signal the market their view about the future prospect of the
property market. Spence (1973) is the pioneer of examining signaling effect in economics.
Signaling arises when there is asymmetric information between two parties. Talmor
(1981) stated that asymmetry of information exits between corporate insiders who
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possess superior information about the firm's financial situation and outside investors.
Those insiders may be the managers or directors of the firm. As asymmetric information
prevails, investors would try to infer the signals sent by the company in order to
understand the company quality.
Talmor(1981) further pointed out that the decision whether or not to signal is not up to
the choice of the firm. It is inevitable. It is because under asymmetric information,
signaling is inherent in any decision that is made by the firm based on its underlying
parameters. A firm can signal the firm quality to the market by various ways. A large
volume of researches have been conducted to investigate the signaling effect of a variety
of financial policies on the company stock price.
Ravid and Sarig (1991)suggested that the company can signal their quality by issuing
dividend and debt-service obligations. According to Flannery(1986) and Diamond(1991),
the maturity of debt chosen by the company would signal the market about the firm credit
quality. They proposed that a firm with good credit rating would choose to issue short
debt. Conversely, under same circumstances, firms with poor credit rating would choose
to issue long debt.
The rationale is that the firm needs to repay the short term debt before the cash generated
from an investment reach the firm and the firm must refinance the debt at the terms that
depend on its future credit rating. Under this circumstance, the firm must be confident
over its future cash flow pattern and its future credit rating. Therefore, if a firm choose to
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issue short debt, it probably have a good credit quality. On the other hand, long term debt
is having maturity matching the timing of the cash flows. The firms are not confident
with its credit rating if a longer maturity is chosen.
In addition, Miller and Rock (1985), Gombola and Ying (1999) proposed that
unexpected dividends signal information about the firm's likely earnings. Unexpected
dividends are commonly viewed as a temporary increase in payout and this would give
the market a signal that the profit of the company increases substantially in the current
year.
3.4.1 Signaling effect of land auction
Signaling effect arises in the real estate market in which asymmetric information prevails.
In the property market, developers are believed to be better informed towards the demand
and supply side of the market. Moreover, they will be more informed of future
government policies, the reason being that they engage in discussions with government
officials more often. With all those superior information, they can easily predict the
future prospect of the real estate market. Every act taken by the developers are known as
“hint” to the investors about the future prospect of the property market. Investors will try
to infer the developer insider’s information by examining its development strategy in
property market.
Land auction would then become the most obvious way for the developers to signal their
view on the future prospect of the property market. It also serves as a channel for the
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investors to infer the insider’s information possessed by the developers. The outcome of
land auction would reflect the view of the developers on the growth prospect of the real
estate market. A land auction with sound performance would signal the market that the
developers are optimistic towards the future vista of the real estate market. The property
market of Hong Kong is rather speculative in nature. The optimistic view held by the
developers would build up the confident of the investors and the potential property
purchasers and drive them to purchase properties immediately to capture the expected
rising trend in the future. The positive market sentiment created by land auctions
stimulates the purchasing incentive of buyers. A sound performance in land auction
further catalyzes the property price to strike its peak in 1997.
In addition, land auction is a kind of common value auction in which there is no true
value on a parcel of land. Developers would make their own valuation based on the
information they perceived towards the true land value. Under asymmetric information,
people believed that the developers are having superior information towards the future
prospect of the property market. Therefore, the price submitted by the developers would
reflect the insider’s information they possessed. An above market winning price reflects
that developer’s valuation which based on their superior information is in the content that
the property market will be flourishing in the near future. This would induce the property
owners and investors to increase to their selling price.
In contrast, if the performance of land auction is below market forecast, this designates
that the developers are not certain with the future outlook of the property market and they
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are of the fear that the price of properties may fall in the near future. This causes them to
be conservative in their bidding strategy to avoid making loss. A poor performance in
land auction would adversely affect the confident of the investor and property owners
towards the future vista of the real estate market. This would then reduce their incentive
to purchase property as they expect that they can buy properties at a cheaper price in the
near future. Investors would have second thoughts on purchasing property due to the
possibility of a fall in the price of the properties at a later stage.
3.4.2 Locality signaling effect
The signaling effect mentioned above would influence the overall property market of
Hong Kong and it can be called as general signaling effect. Locality signaling effect
would only influence the properties nearby and it would substantially affect their prices.
Firstly, if a developer wins a parcel of land at an above market price, this implies that the
developers need to spend a huge amount of capital in the project which gives people a
feeling that the developers are of the view that the property market in that district has the
potential to grow.
In a common value land auction, the developer would determine their reservation price
based on their estimation on the property price of that district in the near future. Land
auction is similar to forward bulk purchase of real estate assets as a residential
development on a vacant land site normally takes 3 years to complete. They need to
ascertain the future property market condition of that district in constructing their
reservation price. The land auction results reflect developer’s expectation about future
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property prices. Therefore, a sound performance in a land auction contributes towards the
developer's view that there would be great potential in the property market in the district.
3.4.3 General signaling effect vs. locality signaling effect
The general signaling effect brought by land auction may not be obvious in the sense that
it is not readily observable. It is because the general signaling effect brought by land
auction may be masked by other factors affecting the property market. The property
market in Hong Kong is vulnerable to various economic factors. A rise in overall
property price cannot drive us to derive the conclusion that the increase is due to the
positive signaling effect as there are other curial factors influencing the market at the
same time. If there is a positive signaling effect induced by a land auction, the overall
property price may decrease as the effect is outweighed by some downside market
condition such as the weakening of Hong Kong economy. The general signaling effect
would be captured in the normal return of the properties as it would influence the overall
property market.
In contrast, locality signaling effect which would be investigated in this dissertation is
more obvious. The benchmark and the bid prices submitted by developers are based on
the future property price within that district. An above market winning price would
reflect a growth potential of the property price of that district and it would induce the
property owners to raise their selling price. As a result, the locality signaling effect would
exert a substantial and observable influence over the property prices nearby.
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3.4.4 Long-term locality signaling effect
The locality signaling effect is expected to exert a long term influence over the property
market nearby. It would drive up the property prices nearby for a longer period of time if
the result of a land auction is sound. The results of land auctions reflect developer’s
expectations about future property price of that district. Land auction is similar to forward
bulk purchase of real estate assets. If the performance of land auction is above market
estimates, it indicates that the developers hold the view that the property market would be
soaring in the near future.
A residential development takes about 3 years to complete, so the developers are
estimating the future property price of that district in formulating their reservation prices.
Under the positive locality signaling effect, investors are notified with the information
that the developers are optimistic towards the future prospect of that district. The property
owners would be induced to increase their selling price and the potential buyers would be
induced to purchase the properties instantly. The influence is expected to be long term as
an above market winning price in the auction would reflect that the developers, who are
holding superior information, are confident about the future vista of the property market
of that district.
3.4.5 Expected Outcome
The abnormal return experienced by the properties nearby is expected to be positive
correlated with the performance of land auction and it would last for a long period of time.
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3.5 Valuation effect
Under common value land auction, developers would estimate the value of the land site
based on the information they perceived towards the true value of the land site. The land
auction price would contain current price information of real estate assets as they would
make reference to current market price of that district in the valuation of the site. The
reservation prices of the developers are different and they represent the developer’s
valuations on the “true” value of the properties of that district. A higher valuation
possessed by the developers reflects that there is a growth potential for the price of
properties nearby or it can be inferred as that the properties nearby are under-valued. As a
result, property owners would be induced to raise price and the buyers would be attracted
to purchase property immediately to capture the growth in later stage.
Moreover, the benchmark which is used to evaluate the performance of land auction is
often based on the general market price of the properties nearby. If there is a sound
performance in land auction, an above market winning price would imply that the
developer is having a higher valuation over the general property price of that district.
In addition, land auction result provides a reliable source of comparables in valuating the
price of properties of that district. Land auction is similar to a bulk purchase of properties
within a district and it can be regarded as a large volume of property transactions.
Developers are purchasing a large volume of properties when they are acquiring the site
and those properties can be sold to generate revenue upon completion of development.
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Price for a property is subjective in nature and it can be evaluated subjectively from
recent market transactions with similar property characteristics.
Land auctions can be treated as a large volume of property transactions of a district and
they acts as a reliable source of comparables since the results of land auctions are open to
public. An above market winning price in an auction would reveal to the investors that
the developer are purchasing a large quantity of properties in that district with an over
market price. Due to the presence of a large quantity of comparables with an above
market transaction price, property owners and investors would be more inclined to
possess views that their properties should be worth more, and therefore would cause them
to increase their selling price accordingly. This positive valuation effect would be exerted
to the property market nearby if the land auction has a sound performance.
3.5.1 Short-term valuation effect
The valuation effect is expected to exert a short term influence over the property market
nearby. Under the influence of positive valuation effect, the property price nearby would
be escalated for a short period of time and it would then return to original level.
Land auction can be treated as a rich source of comparables which reflect the current
market price of the properties. However, property market in Hong Kong is actively
transacted and the transaction volume is huge throughout the year. The valuation effect
induced by the land auctions to the property owners are temporarily as a large volume of
property transaction records will arrive the market after the land auction has taken place
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and they would act as a new source of comparables which influence the valuation of the
properties of that district. New property transactions records of that district may arrive the
market every week and investors would normally rely on the most recent property
transactions in formulating their investment decisions. The large volume of comparables
generated in land auction could be faded away after a short duration of time and they
would only influence the investment decision of the potential buyers and sellers
temporarily.
3.5.2 Expected Outcome
The abnormal return experienced by the properties nearby is expected to be positive
correlated with the performance of land auction and it would last for a short period of
time, like one or two months.
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3.6 Summary
The expected outcome of the three effects induced by land auctions are summarized as
below.
Locality signaling effect Valuation effect
Underlying principle The developers treated the land
auction as a vehicle to signal their
views on the future prospect of
property market
Investors treated the land
auction as a reliable source
of comparables
Characteristics Land auction results reflect
developers’expectation about future
property prices
The land auction price
therefore contains current
price information of real
estate assets










return experienced by the
properties nearby
Long Short, like one or two
months
A land auction may exert both locality signaling effect and valuation effect to the
property market nearby as these two effects are not counteracting. The major difference
between the two effects is the duration of impact exerted to the properties nearby. The locality
signaling effect would influence the property prices for a relatively longer period. This





Real estate property index
Index numbers of prices of real estate properties are difficult to construct due to
property’s heterogeneity. Comparison of properties price index provides us with an
insight into the current situation of the market. As explained by Bailey and Nourse (1963),
the major problem is the great difference in quality among properties. To overcome this
problem, quality-adjusted price indexes were developed. Among all those methods,
hedonic pricing models and repeat sales model appear to be the most compromising.25
These two models deal with the problem of quality variation of real estate properties and
they based on rationale proposed by Rosen (1974) that heterogeneous goods can be
viewed as a bundle of attributes.
4.1 Hedonic Pricing Model
Hedonic prices are defines by Rosen (1974) as “the implicit price of attributes and are
revealed to economic agents from observed prices of differentiated products and the
specific amounts of characteristics associated with them”. Hedonic pricing model
recognizes the heterogeneity of real estate properties and postulate the relationship
between price of the properties and housing attributes.
25 PALMQUIST, R. B. (1980) Alternative Techniques for Developing Real Estate Price Indexes. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 62, 442-448.
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Butler (1982) suggested that several attributes have a significant effect on the property
price and they should be taken into consideration in constructing the model. Those
housing attributes should be costly to produce and they would yield utility to a resident.
In general, the housing attributes can be classified into these three types:
I. Structural traits (S)
II. Location traits (L)
III. Neighborhood traits (N)
Thus, the market price (P) of the property can be expressed as
P= f (L,S,N)
Hedonic pricing model tackles the problem of property’s heterogeneity by regressing the
transaction prices into a series of property attributes such as size, age and views. A












where itP denotes the logarithm of the transaction price of property i at time t ( i = 1,… .,n;
t = 1,… ..T), j denotes the implicit price for the
thj property attributes jitY ( j = 1,… .J),
t denotes the logarithm of the price index at time t, itD denotes the time dummy, which
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set to 1 if the thi flat is sold at time t and to 0 if otherwise, and it denotes the error term
with mean zero and variance 2

 .
As explained by Palmquist (1980), after a hedonic equation has been correctly specified,
it can be used to generate price index. One way to achieve this is to incorporate time
dummy variables in data that have been aggregated over two or more periods. The
coefficient of these variables can be used to calculate the index.
The major criticisms of this model are the assumption on the functional form and the
difficulty in specifying and measuring a correct and complete set of attributes. 26The
problem of functional form can be solved by using either flexible parameterizations f
them model or nonparametric27 techniques. The second drawback can’t be tackled easily
as it is not practical to include all housing attributes into the equation. It may rely on the
heroic assumption that all omitted variables are orthogonal to those included in the
analysis.28
26 CHAU, K. W., WONG, S. K. & YIU, C. Y. (2005) Adjusting for Non-Linear Age Effects in the Repeat
Sales Index The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 31, 137-153.
27 See “PACE, R. K. (1993) Nonparametric Methods with Applications to Hedonic Models. The Journal of
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 7, 185-204.
28 WALLACE, N. E. & MEESE, R. A. (1997) The Construction of Residential Housing Price Indices: A
Comparison of Repeat-Sales, Hedonic-Regression, and Hybrid Approaches Journal The Journal of Real
Estate Finance and Economics 14, 51-73.
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4.2 Repeat sales model
Repeat sales model was established by Bailey and Nourse (1963). It is later refined by
Palmquist (1979; 1982) and Case and Shiller (1989). Repeat sales model controls quality
by measuring the price of the same property in different period of time. The change in
price between two or more sales on the same property is captured and it focused on the
actual appreciation of individual properties. These changes are processed using
regressions method to generate the desired index. As explained by Chau, Wong et al.
(2005), this model makes use of the fact that the quality of a property does not change
much over time so that the property attributes need not be specified.
For better illustration, the following example is given to demonstrate the use of repeat
sales model. By making use of Hedonic pricing model and assuming a linear functional
form, the price for property i in period T is given in equation (1) whereas the price for























where itP denotes the logarithm of the transaction price of property i at time t ( i = 1,… .,n;
t = 1,… ..T), j denotes the implicit price for the
thj property attributes jitY ( j = 1,… .J),
t denotes the logarithm of the price index at time t, itD denotes the time dummy, which
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set to 1 if the thi flat is sold at time t and to 0 if otherwise, and it denotes the error term


























, where the subscript T and t denote the first sale and the second sale of property i, and
itTD and itT denote )( iTit DD  and )( iTit   respectively.
4.2.1 Assumptions










 in equation (3) to vanish, the following
assumption must hold.29
1. The property characteristics do not changed between sales.
2. The marginal contribution of those characteristics to overall house price are stable
across periods.
Numerous transaction pairs are obtained and the repeat sales index which is the
coefficient of time dummy variables can be achieved through the use of regression
analysis. This approach assumes that property characteristics and their implicit prices do
not change between the first sale (T) and the second sale (t). This can eliminate the need
29 DOMBROW, J., KNIGHT, J. R. & SIRMANS, C. F. (1997) Aggregation Bias in Repeat-Sales Indics.
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 14, 75-88.
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of specifying the housing attributes and functional form for the model. Because of the
large property transaction volume in Hong Kong, repeat sales model becomes useful and
can easily be constructed to observe the price movement of property market.
Repeat sales model has been criticized for its inefficient use of data (Case, Pollakowski et
al, 1991; Knight, Dombrow et al.,1995), sample selection basis (Clapp and Giaccotto,
1992; Wallace and Meese, 1997) and ignoring the age effects. ( Chau, Wong et al., 2005;
Brown and Warner, 1980; Bailey and Nourse, 1963)
4.2.2 Inefficient use of data
Repeat Sales methodology needs to discard a large percentage of samples in constructing
the index.30 The transactions need to be repeated and the property characteristics should
not be change within the given period of time in order to act as a sample in constructing
the index. Abraham and Schauman (1991), Mark and Goldberg (1984) found that a large
volume of sample have been discarded due to these two conditions. If the period of
samples collection is lengthened, it would certainly generate a larger volume of sales
pairs. However, it would in term decreases the number of transactions which its property
characteristics kept unchanged over the period. It would give rise to heteroskedasticity.31
4.2.3 Sample selection basis
30 CLAPP, J. M. & GIACCOTTO, C. (1992) Repeat Sales Methodology for Price Trend Estimation: An
Evaluation for Sample Selectivity. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 5, 357-374.
31 CASE, K. E. & SHILLER, R. J. (1989) The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes? The
American Economic Review, 79, 125-137.
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Moreover, Clapp and Giaccotto (1992) also questioned whether such a small number of
repeat sales transactions can represent the entire transaction volumes and sample
selection basis would affect the price trend estimate.
4.2.4 Ignoring the age effects
According to Chau, Wong et al. (2005), age effects refer to the change of property value
when it ages over time, ceteris paribus. There are mainly three sources of age effects.
Firstly, the age effects may caused by the physical deterioration and the functional
obsolescence of the properties over times. It would reduce the productivity and give rise
to higher maintenance cost. Secondly, properties those sell three or more times have
significantly lower market values than those that sell only twice. Those properties would
be regarded as lemons and it would have a lower market value than those properties
which have fewer historical transactions.
Thirdly, for a leasehold property, the income which will be generated from property will
be negatively related to the residual length of leasehold interest which in term affecting
the price of the properties. A shorter residual length of leasehold interest would reduce
the future income stream and it would reduce the price of the property. The presence of
age effects between two transactions of the same property would jeopardize the




As explained by Dombrow, Knight et al.(1997), aggregation bias may occur in
constructing repeat sales indices. As repeat sales indices are derived from hedonic pricing
model, it also suffers from the aggregation bias. The repeat sales model assumes that the
properties characteristics would not changed in between two sales and this could be
achieved by attribute control. However, repeat sales model failed to measure the value of
property attributes in which a change of value would intervene the result. Even if a
perfect attribute control is implemented, there are still a number of ways for the marginal
values of attributes to change over time to produce significant change in property price.
In another words, the increase in property price between two sales can’t not be purely
explained by appreciation of property value since it may due to the increase in marginal
contribution of housing attributes. Since housing index is generated from aggregate data,
this kind of bias is hard to avoid.
4.2.6 Application of Repeat Sales model
Despite those drawbacks accompany with repeat sale model, it has been widely used to
measure the movements in price of the property market.32 Abraham and Schauman (1991)
employed this approach with Freddie Mac data. McMillen (2003) made use of repeat sale
index to identify changes in the house price distance gradient over time using Chicago
Property market data. In Chau, Leung et al. (2003), repeat sales model is employed to
investigate the impact of refurbishments on the property value. It is utilized to identify
the price differentials from the price indexes of the building/estate before and after




refurbishment. It provides a clear indicator on the effect of refurbishment on property
price.
4.3 Measuring return of properties
Repeat Sales index is employed in this dissertation to estimate how capital growth in a
housing market in a particular area has changed over time. Repeat Sales approach was
proposed by Bailey, Muth and Nourse in 1963. In repeat sales index, each property is
compared only with previous sales of itself. By taking 'sale pairs' on every property for
which it have two or more sales, the growth between those two sales is measured. Repeat
sales model controls quality by making use of the fact that quality of building would not
change significantly in between two transactions. If there is a large number of
transactions pairs of the same property over a specific period of time, repeat sales index
can be created which tracks the general price movement of properties during this period.
The repeat sales index used in this paper is under certain modifications to suit the
situation in Hong Kong. The index is constructed based on the actual transactions
registered in Land Registry of HKSAR. The index covers the whole HKSAR and it
divides the whole region into three regions, namely Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and
New Territories. Within each region, it is sub-divided into a number of small districts
such as Wong Tai Sin, Tai Po and Stanley. It can capture the change in price level even in
small district. Moreover, the index is constructed on monthly basis so that a small change
which last for short duration can also be captured.
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The monthly repeat sales index of a sub-district is presented as a percentage change of
general price level of that district relative to previous month. A positive figure indicates
that there is an appreciation in general price level of that district compared with previous
month.
4.3.1 Measuring cumulative return of properties
Repeat sales index is obtained to calculate the cumulative return of the properties.
tR represents the cumulative return of the properties nearby and t represents the period
number. There are in total six periods after the auction month. 3R represents the
cumulative return of the properties three months before the land auction and it is the




Figure 3. The detail of the time line
4.3.1 The application of repeat sales index in Hong Kong property market33
Hedonic pricing model can also be used to create a property price index. Under this
approach, properties can be viewed as a bundle of attributes which would produce
marginal contribution to the property price. However, this method is not applicable in
Hong Kong since there is insufficient information regarding the property attributes and
33 Based on CHAU, K. W. (2006) The University of Hong Kong Real Estat Index Series.
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their respective marginal contribution to the property price. In addition, there is no prior
knowledge towards the function form of hedonic pricing model.
Repeat Sales index would be more applicable to the situation in Hong Kong. Property
market in Hong Kong is actively transacted and the transaction volume is huge
throughout the year. In the light of large transaction volume, the same properties can be
transacted in two or more times within a short period. In another word, a large volume of
repeated sales pairs can easily be obtained to construct the desired index. A sufficient
volume of repeat sales pairs would still be retained after discarding those transactions
with long holding periods.
Secondly, the average holding period for repeat sales pairs in Hong Kong is relatively
short. This would reduce the possibility of heterogeneity since the quality of the property
would not change significantly as the two transactions for the same property occurs
within a short time interval. Thirdly, most of the residential units in Hong Kong are
regulated under Building regulations which prohibited substantial remodeling. Fourthly,
the price of land in Hong Kong is relatively high. A large proportion of property price is
attributable to the land price and thus, renovation of flat would only result a small
appreciation in property price. All in all, properties in Hong Kong would not change













2005/06 115,166 -3.3 358,353 2.0
2004/05 119,128 14.6 351,168 42.4
2003/04 103,953 28.2 246,564 41.2
2002/03 81,075 -9.6 174,628 -10.6
2001/02 89,733 4.1 195,237 -8.2
2000/01 86,214 -5.2 212,621 -13.4
1999/00 90,923 -20.5 245,625 -12.8
1998/99 114,350 -35.7 314,059 -57.3
1997/98 177,861 4.6 736,096 20.0
1996/97 170,008 55.1 613,393 102.7
Table 2. Sale and Purchase Agreements of Building Units Lodged for Registration
Source : Ten-Year Statistical Summary. The Land Registry of HKSAR Government.
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Chapter 5 Research Design
5.1 Definition of the properties located nearby
In this dissertation, properties located nearby are defined as the properties which located
in the same sub-district as the auctioned site. The sub-district is classified according to
the repeat sales index provided by the Department of Real Estate and Construction. The
land sites which have been sold in public auction would be classified into various sub-
districts and the properties which located in the same sub-district as the auctioned site
would be treated as sample and the price movement of the sample would be investigated
in this study.
5.2 Type of land site
In this study, only the sites with residential land use would be considered. Other land use
such as industrial and purely commercial would be discarded as their auction outcomes
are expected not to generate any influence on the residential property market. Some land
sites are under the use of composite development which comprises with commercial and
residential development. This kind of land site would also be studied in this dissertation
as the land site can also be used as residential development and it may influence the
property market nearby.
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5.3 Time frame
It is essential to define the time horizon in this dissertation in order to investigate whether
the effect of land auction is short lasting. One more reason is that the change of property
price upon the release of land auction results is studied in this dissertation, so it is
necessary to define when are the “before” and “after” value of the properties.
In this dissertation, repeat sales index was employed to investigate the impact of land
auctions to nearby property prices and it is constructed in monthly basis. Sub-district
index of an appropriate month before the land auction should be chosen to act as the
benchmark to evaluate the change in property price due to land auction. The month of the
sub-district index chosen should represent the general price level of that sub-district
without the influence of land auction.
5.3.1 Event date
In this dissertation, event date is defined as the date in which public land auctions are
held. In Hong Kong, land auctions are occurred at a definite date and it would be
announced by the government in the March of each year in the regular land sale. For the
land application list system, the date of land auction would be announced upon successful
application and the auction would normally take place after a few weeks of the
announcement. A clear and precise event date would facilitate the use of event study
methodology to investigate the abnormal return brought by land auction.34 Researchers
can determine certainly the time in which the result of land auction arrive the market and
34 MCWILLIAMS, A., SIEGEL, D. & TEOH, S. H. (1999) Issues in the Use of the Event Study Methodology: A
Critical Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility Studies. Organizational Research Methods, 2, 340-365.
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it provide ease to determine the appropriate estimation period and event window to
capture the abnormal return aroused from land auctions.
According to the event study methodology developed by FFJR (1969), event study is
conducted in daily basis. However, a property transaction normally takes 2 months to
complete which is different from that of stock market in which transaction can be
completed almost instantly.35 The effect of land auction on property market cannot be
reflected instantaneously. Therefore, monthly return should be used to indicate the
change in price level of the properties which locate close to the land site. The month in
which land auction took place is called as “event month” and it is defined as month 0.
The month before the event month is defined as month -1 while the month after is defined
as month 1. Cumulative return on properties within a sub-district is defined as tR , in
which t representing the period number.
5.3.2 Event Window
The period of time in which the property price is affected by the news of land auction is
called the event window. The event window is defined as six months after the month in
which the land auction is held and it is also defined as the “After Auction Period”. The
movement in general price level of the residential properties nearby will be examined in
the event window and it is represented by tR , in which t represents period number, from
1 to 6.
35 See Appendix 2 for detail of property transaction process
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5.3.3 Estimation period
According to MacKinlay (1997), the most common choice of the estimation period would
be a short period of time prior to the event window. During the estimation period, a
normal return of an asset is estimated and it is assumed to be its expected normal returns
during the event window.36
In this dissertation, three months before the land auction month is defined as the
“estimation period”. Property price of the sub-district in which a parcel of land is going to
be sold in public auction is studied during the estimation period which is defined as three
months before the land auction take place. The change in price level of that sub-district
during the estimation period would represent the normal market return of the properties
among that district and it is represented by 3R as the estimation period is three months
prior to the event month. The return of properties within the affected district during the
estimation period is assumed to be the expected normal return of the properties
throughout the event window.
The estimation period chosen should be the period of time in which the property market
is free from the influence of land auction. Otherwise, the market return estimated during
the estimation period would be biased as it is contaminated by the information of land
auctions.
36 HENDERSON, G. V. (1990) Problems and Solutions in Conducting Event Studies. The Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 57, 282-306.
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The difference between the property prices of that sub-district in the “Estimation period”
and “event window” is calculated and it reflects the degree of impact brought by the land
auction to the nearby property price. This dissertation proposes that a positive figure
would be obtained if the performance of land auction is sound. The property prices three
months before the land auction are used as a reference point to measure the impact of the
land auction. Three months before the land auction is undertaken because there is a
significant time difference away from the land auction date and therefore is considered to
be free from any interference of news regarding the land auction which could potentially
affect property price.
Moreover, in the case of land application list system, land auction date would be
announced upon successful application and the land auction would normally take place
within a few weeks after the announcement. People who anticipate a sound performance
in land auction may take advantage from buying the properties nearby instantly once the
land auction date is announced. This would influence the property price within that sub-
district and the repeat sales index of that month could not reflect the fair general price
level due to the influence of land auction. The pre-auction effect due to land auction
should not be neglected and the effect would be more significantly during the flourishing
market.
As Tse (2000) pointed out, the valuation made by the developers are highly influenced by
the prevailing market sentiments. When the real estate prices are soaring, the optimistic
market sentiment would induce the developers to bid more aggressively in land auctions
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and thus a high land price would be resulted. Therefore, investors would easily anticipate
a sound performance in land auction in booming market as developers are more willing to
spend more in purchasing land for development. Investors may make profit by buying
property before the auction is held and sell it after a sound performance of land auction is
heard. In order to control for the influence on property prices due to pre-auction effect,
three months before the land auction month is chosen as there is no prior information
towards the land application proceed by the developers three months before the land
auction.
5.3.4 Time line of the study
Figure 4. Time line of the study (under land application system)
Event Window (6 months)
After Auction Period
Land Auction Month
Months1 2 3 4 5 6
Time Line (Land Application List System)
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Figure 5. Time line of the study (under regular land sale)
5.4 Measuring abnormal return
As explained by Brown and Warner (1980), abnormal return of an asset i equals to the
difference between its observed return and its expected return generated by a particular
market model.
ititit KRA 
, where itK , is the expected return generated by a particular market model, itA represents
the abnormal return of an asset i in period t. There are some popular market models







Event Window (6 months)
After Auction Period
Land Auction Month
Months1 2 3 4 5 6
Time Line (Regular land Sale)
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In this dissertation, three market models would be used to generate the market return and
they are known as mean returns model, market returns and a modified market returns
model. A positive abnormal return over the event window indicates that the result of land
auction generated a positive impact on the property prices nearby.
5.5 Measuring market return
In this dissertation, three different market models are used to control for the influence on
property price nearby due to factors other than outcome of land auction. They are known
as mean returns model, market returns and a modified market returns model. They would
be discussed in detail one by one.
5.5.1 Market return model
The price level of the properties which located near to the land site may rise even if the
outcome of land auction is under market estimates. This may occur in booming market in
which all investors are optimistic towards the future of property market. The adverse
impact brought by land auction may be out-weighted by the strong market growth in
property price. The impact on the property price nearby due to market influence must be
discarded in order to observe the net change in price level of the properties nearby before
and after the auction.
Normal return for the properties near land site needed to be estimated during the event
window with the purpose of controlling the influence on property price nearby due to
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factors other than outcome of land auction. The normal return for the affected properties
can be estimated based on the return of the overall property market which is said to be
market return. The market return of the properties located close to the site reflects all
market events which include the land auction outcome, that affect the overall property
market.
The impact of land auction would be reflected on the cumulative abnormal return of the
properties which located in same sub-district with the land site. The cumulative abnormal
return is the return excessive to market return and it can be calculated by deducting the
cumulative monthly return of the properties within that sub-district with the cumulative
market return.
In this dissertation, the whole Hong Kong is divided into three regions, namely Hong
Kong Island (HKI), Kowloon (KLN), New Terrorties(NTZ). Within each region, it is
further sub-divided into a number of sub-districts such as Wong Tai Sin, Tai Po and
Stanley. The monthly repeat sales indexes of the three regions were obtained and they act
as the benchmark to estimate the cumulative abnormal return of a sub-district. Sub-
district indexes were also set up to capture the abnormal return brought by the land
auction on the properties which located close to the land site. The return of a region
designates the normal market return of the properties which located in a sub-district
under that region. The cumulative regional market return is defined as , in which t
representing the period number.
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Regional market return = tM
Take an example for better illustration, suppose we are going to investigate the impact of
land auction of a site which is located in Wong Tai Sin. Regional market index of
Kowloon should be used as the market return. The difference between the cumulative
sub-district return ( tR ) of Wong Tai Sin and the cumulative regional market return of
Kowloon ( tM ) during the event window represents the abnormal return induced by the







,where tY represents the cumulative abnormal return of the properties in Wong Tai Sin
under market return model, is the cumulative return of properties in Wong Tai Sin
with t running from 1 to 6 and is the return of properties in Kowloon with t running
from 1 to 6. Cumulative abnormal returns of properties in Wong Tai Sin are calculated
for each month during the event window.
Regional market return is used instead of the overall property market return because it
represents a more specific market return to the properties within the sub-district.
Properties which fall within different regions are having significant difference in location
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attribute which would greatly influence the reaction of properties price due to land
auction.
It is essential to point out that the outcome of a land auction would affect both the overall
property market and the properties which located close to the land site. They are said to
be general effect and area-specific effect. General effect would influence the overall
property market disregards whether the properties are located next to the land site. Land
auctions are known as the indicator of the Hong Kong real estate industry and a sound
performance of land auction designated that the developers are confident towards the
future which may result an increase in overall property price. The general effect are
regarded as the general signaling effect which would be reflected by the market return
over the event window.
The area-specific effect is specific to the properties which located close to the land site
and it can be separately into two different effects, valuation effect and the locality
signaling effect. The influences exerted by these two effects are reflected in the
abnormal return experienced by the properties nearby.
5.5.2 Constant return model
Constant return model is rather straightforward and it involves simple calculation since
only one parameter is used and the estimation of market return is not required. 37 In this
37 BINDER, J. J. (1998) The Event Study Methodology Since 1969. Review of Quantitative Finance and
Accounting, 11, 111–137.
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model, the average return of an asset during the estimation period is calculated and the
asset is assumed to generate the same return during the event window. In another words,
the average return experienced by the asset during the estimation period is assumed to be
the normal return of the asset for the duration of event window.
In this dissertation, three months before the event month is defined as estimation period.
The return of properties which located in the same sub-district with the land site during
the estimation period is calculated and it is assumed to its normal return during the event









, where tDc3 represents the cumulative abnormal return of the sample under constant
return model, t represents the mouth number which running from 1 to 6 and 3R is the
return of sample during the estimation period.
The problem accompany with this method is that the normal return of properties nearby
may change over time as the impacts of some events may alter the underlying risk of the
properties. In another words, the normal return obtained during the estimation period may
be substantial different from that during the event window and this would incur bias to
our study.
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5.5.3 Modified constant return model
In order to rectify the drawback of constant return model, a new market model is set up in
this dissertation and it is a modified version of the constant return model. Constant return
model suffers from the problem of varying normal return during the event window. It is
also not realistic that the properties are generating the same normal return during event
window as it does for the duration of the estimation period. In this model, both the returns
of properties during the estimation period and for the duration of the event window are
adjusted for the market return. This can be achieved by subtracting the return of
properties by the sub-regional market return in order to control for the effect of changing
normal return during the investigating period. This method can also be recognized as a
hybrid model between constant return model and market return model. Abnormal return












, where tDy3 represents the cumulative abnormal return of sample under modified constant return
model, t represents the mouth number which running from 1 to 6, 3R is the return of sample
during the estimation period and 3M is the cumulative regional market return during the
estimation period.
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5.6 Measuring the performance of a land auction
This paper suggests that the performance of land auctions would influence the property
price nearby for a certain period of time. The magnitude of impact on the property price
resulted from the outcome of land auction are directly proportional to the performance of
land auction. In another words, a land auction which its outcome exceeds the market
estimates greatly would bring a stronger positive impact to the property price nearby and
vice versa. Therefore, it is vital to construct a performance indicator to evaluate the
outcome of land auction and to measure the extent of which exceeds or fall below the
market estimates. There are a number of ways to evaluate the performance of a land
auction.
5.6.1Pre-auction forecast made by surveyors
In this dissertation, a performance indicator which based on the market estimates on the
expected outcome of land auction is constructed. Valuers from different surveying firms
would estimate the value of the land sites before the auction date. They produce their
estimations by various valuation methods such as residual land value method, future cash
flow analysis and Sale Comparison analysis. Most of them arrives their estimations by
making use of the general price level of some large private residential estates nearby
which based on the transaction records obtained from EPRC. They would calculate the
buildable floor area of the land by making use of the plot ratio shown in the Explanatory
Note of the Outline Zoning Plan (OZP). Valuers should estimate the value of the land
based on the highest and best use of the land. They would also estimate the cost of
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construction by making reference to similar projects. The value of land would be
obtained after deducting the development value of the land which under best use with the
construction cost.
Local newspaper would report the detail of the land site before the land auction date and
the article normally includes the following information:
1. Lot no. of the land Site
2. Location of the site
3. Size of the land
4. Use of the land
5. Maximum Plot ratio
6. Maximum Buildable Floor area
7. Reserve price ( for land site under land application system)
8. Estimations from various surveyors
The article would list out the names of surveyors and their respective estimates on land
price. Valuation is not exact science and it is subjective in nature. Valuation of land can
be done by various ways and the method of valuation is up to the choice of the surveyors.
Also, the whole process of valuation depends greatly on the knowledge, experience,
expertise and ability of the valuer. Therefore, different surveyors would produce different
valuation results towards the same parcel of land. However, the estimations from
different surveyors would not deviate greatly from each other. Firstly, the cost of
construction fall within a small range as the type and intensity of development is pre-
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determined by the land lease. Other costs such as professional fee, interest payment and
profit are extracted from data base and they would not deviate much from general market
consensus.
Secondly, the maximum of plot ratio of the land is restricted by Building ordinance and
the relaxation of it required planning application. Therefore, the buildable floor area is
theoretically restricted and it is known to all surveyors. The major differences in
estimating the land value rest on the forecast selling price of the flats upon completion
and the amount of exempted gross floor area(GFA) can obtained in constructing green
features, car-parking and club house. Application should be made to Building Authority
in exempting gross floor area in constructing those facilities38. By applying exemption for
GFA, developers can gain extra GFA which increase the development value of the land.
Therefore, the differences in estimations of land price made by surveyors are mainly due
to their deviations in forecasting the selling price of flats and the amount of exempted
GFA obtained.
The forecast selling price of the flats upon completion are based on the general price
level of the properties which located close to the land site. Surveyors arrive diverse
estimations is due to the fact that different comparables are used and the amount of
adjustment made to the comparables. However, the forecast selling price made by
different surveyors would fall within a reasonable range as the comparables they used are
subject to the same locational attribute which is determinant to the property price. Other
difference in quality of properties would be adjusted subjectively by surveyors. The
38 PNAP for green and innovative building. http://www.pland.gov.hk/tech_doc/joint_pn/jpn01_e.pdf
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amount of exempted GFA will be awarded in the project is subjectively estimated based
on the experience of individual surveyor. Surveyors would make up certain percentage of
the permissible GFA to account for the exempted GFA.
Different surveyors would make their predications on the outcome of land auction and it
would be published in local newspapers before auction date. The publishing date of the
detail of land auctions is up to the choice of the reporters and the article would normally
be published one or two days before land auction. Therefore, newspapers two days in
advance the land auction would be read to collect market estimates which are given by
various surveyors. Newspaper at the auction date would also be read since some of the
surveyors may make changes to his estimations and it can ensure that the estimations are
the most updated. Seven local newspapers would be read with the aim of capturing all the
market estimates from different surveyors. A fair market estimate would be obtained by
averaging the estimations made by different surveyors. The following example illustrates
how the market estimate is obtained.
Chapter 5 Research Design
Page | 86
Land Auction date: 12/6/1998
Data range: 10/6/1998-12/6/1998
Source of data: Seven Local newspapers
Location of the land: 7, Queen’s Road, HK
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After obtaining the general market estimate towards a parcel of land, a ratio which is
named as “Relative Performance Ratio” is set up to evaluate the performance of a land
auction. Relative Performance Ratio is a ratio between the winning bid of a land site and
its average pre-auction market forecasts made by the surveyors. It is calculated as follow:
Relative Performance ratio (Rp) = ForecastsMarketAvergage
BidWinning
The land auction is said to be having a sound performance if the ratio is greater than one
and it is believed that it would convey a positive impact to the property price nearby. If
the ratio for a land auction is smaller than one, then the land auction is said to be having a
poor performance and it would adversely affect the property price nearby. A similar way
is also adopted in Tse (2000) to classify the outcome of land auction.
The Relative Performances of the land sites under investigations
Relative Performance
Sound (Rp >1) As expected ( Rp=1) Poor (Rp<1)
Number of land sites 73 2 29
% of the total 70.2% 1.92% 27.88%
Table 3 The Relative Performances of the land sites under investigations
Advantage under this approach
This method is rather straightforward and easily applicable. It carries the advantage that
the surveyors would account for the effect of exempted GFA in estimating the value of
the site. The amount of exempted GFA obtained by developer would considerably alter
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the site value. Exempted GFA is the GFA which is exempted from the calculation of total
GFA subject to the permission from the Building Authority. Exempted GFA can be
treated as some additional GFA to the development as they can also be sold as revenue.
The exempted GFA awarded are normally included in the calculation of the GFA of a flat
and it implies that the exempted GFA can be sold to the customer to generate profit.
However, exempted GFA is not desirable to the property buyers. The increase of
exempted GFA would reduce the usable Floor area of a flat as most of the exempted GFA
awarded in the development is not accompany with individual flat, instead, they are
spread around the whole development, such as communal sky garden and podium garden,
which could not be solely enjoyed by the owner.
Developers can acquire exempted GFA by a number of ways and the most common way
is to construct the green features in the proposed development. Developers could apply to
Building Authority for exemption of GFA for the green features constructed, such as
balconies, wider common corridors and lift lobbies. The amount of exempted GFA
awarded depends on the decision of the Building Authority. Exempted GFA is always
good to the developers as it would bring extra revenue to the development. Therefore, the
amount of exempted GFA in the development should be estimated in evaluating the land
value as it would alter the land value significantly.
The strong market sense of surveyors enables them to estimate the land value based on
the current market condition. They know more about the demand and supply of the
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property market and they understand the general market trend which can assist them in
deriving a fair market value of the site. In addition, their experience in valuation helps
them in estimating the actual cost of the development and the degree of adjustment made
to the comparables. Therefore, this method serves as a better way in evaluating the
performance of a land auction.
5.6.2 Other ways to generate the market estimates
In this dissertation, estimations of land price are obtained from different surveyors in
order to evaluate the performance of land auctions. Their estimations of land price are
averaged to give the market estimate for the land auction. The market estimate acts as the
benchmark to evaluate the performance of the land auctions. There are still several ways
to generate the market estimates and the pros and cons of each method will be addressed
in the following section.
5.6.2.1 Price markup ratio
Another way suggested by Tse(2000) is to make use of the announced base price at the
beginning of the auction. The land site would start at its starting bid price which is set by
the auctioneer in the English auction and the developers would call out their desirable
price. Price markup which equals to the ratio of the winning bid to the starting bid
provides another mean to appraise the performance of a land auction.
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Drawbacks of this approach
However, this method has a number of drawbacks. As explained by Ching and Fu (2003),
a large price markup like 2 or even 2.5 would only reflect the attractiveness of the
reservation price, but not the performance of land auction. A high price markup cannot
drive us to derive the conclusion that the land auction is having a sound performance.
Moreover, this method involves the selection of an arbitrary figure to classify the
performance of land auction Nevertheless, the price markup for different land sites would
be substantial deviated from each other and it is difficult to determine a reasonable figure
for the price markup in the classification of the performance of a land auction.
5.6.2.2 General property price level nearby
Other than the method suggested above, another way is to compare the forecast selling
price per sq. feet of the land site after completion with a large private residential housing
nearby and it is said to be a sound performance if the former is greater the latter.
Within the same private residential housing, there is a general price level. Subject to the
same location attribute, the property price within the same housing estate would not
deviate greatly from district average. The price difference may vary with the floor level,
size and view of the flats. The price per sq. feet in the same housing estate will fall within
a small range and the mean of the range can represent the general price level of the
private residential housing estate. Price per sq. feet should be used rather than the market
transaction price because it presents a figure that is easier to compare. Those transaction
Chapter 5 Research Design
Page | 91
records can be obtained from EPRC which includes size of the flats and the price per sq.
feet.
The forecast selling price can be found in the newspapers after the land auction and this
would be regarded as the expected selling price of the flats after the development is
completed. Surveyors would forecast the selling price of the flats through careful
consideration of construction cost, interest expenses, professional fee and advertising fee.
There should be some large private residential property housings near the land site and
their general price level can be extracted to evaluate the performance of the land auction.
The monthly average price per sq. feet ( xD ) of a large residential housing nearby should
be calculated. This can represent the general price level of the private properties among
that district . The housing estate chosen should match with the allowable development
intensity of the land site. A low rise residential housing estate should be chosen if the
land is under R1 or R2. The relative performance of a parcel of land can be calculated
based on the following formula.
Performance of land auction ( pR ) = Forecast Selling price per sq. ft. of the land ( xF ) /
Monthly average price per sq. ft. of a large residential private housing nearby ( xD )… (1)
The land auction is said to be having a sound performance if pR greater than one, vice
versa. If pR is greater than one, the forecast selling price of the flats is greater than the
general price level of the residential estate nearby. Home owners would be more
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optimistic towards the properties market and they would increase their selling price.
Home purchase would also increase their offers as they may think that the market price is
currently below the forecast selling price and it got potential to rise up. It is worthy to
purchase the properties now and would offer a higher price to buy the flats to capture the
growth in price. Therefore, the property price nearby would increase if there is a sound
performance in land auction.
Here is the example, there will be a land auction held in 20th June 2007 and the land is
located in Mei Foo. The size of the land is 50,000 sq.ft. and it is having a plot ratio of 10
under residential use. Therefore, the building floor area is 500,000 sq.ft..
After the auction is finished, the average price per sq.feet of the land can be calculated by
dividing the winning bid with buildable floor area. The winning bid is said to be
HKD$250 million and so the price per feet of the land is HKD$5000. The forecast selling
price of the flats can be obtained from newspapers after the land auction and it is assumed
to be HKD$5500 per sq. feet. Mei Foo Sun Chuen is a large private residential housing
estate and its property transactions are very active. The property price in Mei Foo Sun
Chuen can be treated as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of that land auction.
The average price per sq feet of Mei Foo Sun Chuen in June 2007 can be obtained from
EPRC and it is said to be HKD$5000 per sq. feet.
Therefore, there will be a difference HK$500 per sq. feet between the forecast selling
price and the general price level of Mei Foo Sun Chuen. By equation (1), performance of
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land auction is 1.1 and it out-performs the market level by 10%. The land auction result is
good and it is believed to boost up the property price nearby.
On the other hand, there will be the case that even the winning price per sq feet ( pW ) of
the land will be greater the general price level of the large residential estates nearby( xD ).
The forecast selling price of the flats which include all those construction costs would
undoubtedly greater than the general price level ( xD ). This scenario is not rare in Hong
Kong during the 1997 and 2007 when property market is flourishing. People named this
as “Flour is more expensive than bread” in which flour represents the land and bread
represents the currently available residential properties. This is a strong flourishing signal
for the property market as the developers are willing to pay high price for the land site
and they are optimistic towards the future. People would expect the property price to rise
up significantly in the future since land price is even higher than the price of properties
which are readily available. This would insert a positive impact to the property price
nearby.
Drawbacks of this approach
However, this method is not used in this dissertation to generate the benchmark. Firstly,
large residential housing estate which locate near to the land site may probably old in age
since only those housing estate would have active transaction volume each month which
can represent the general price level of that district. The forecast selling price made the
surveyors is based on a newly completed housing estate and the price is believed to be
higher than that of an old residential housing estate. This method ignores the age effect
Chapter 5 Research Design
Page | 94
embedded in the housing estate nearby and this would over-estimate the performance of
the land auction. Even if the land auction is having sound performance and pR is greater
than one, the difference between the forecast selling price and the general price level
cannot be purely explained by the appreciation of property price as it may due to the old
age of the residential housing estate nearby.
Secondly, it is questionable that whether the average property price of a large residential
housing estate can represent the general price level of that district. Therefore, it is not a
good benchmark to evaluate the performance of land auction. Thirdly, the forecast selling
prices given by various surveyors are lack of sufficient support and they are not
appropriate to act as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of land auction
5.6.2.3 Residual land value
Another way to evaluate the outcome of land auction is to calculate the land value by the
residual method. Land value is the residual amount after the Gross Development Value
(GDV) of the land less the expenses including constructing cost, professional fee, interest
payment and advertisement fee. GDV can be obtained by multiplying the buildable floor
area of the land by the forecast selling price of the flats upon completion. Expenses in
construction cost depend on the type and quality of the building and the unit costs
required in calculation are normally found from historical data. The professional fee and
advertisement fee is taken from a certain percentage of the GDV and the interest rate will
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be the best lending rate or a certain percentage less the best lending rate. Profit of
developer would also be included.
Residual land value for every parcel of land is calculated and the ratio of winning bid to
residual land value reflects the performance of that land auction. If the ratio is greater
than one, the land auction is said to be having a sound performance. This method is not
practical as some figures used in calculation are hard to predict such as the forecast
selling price. Moreover, it is very time-consuming to calculate the residual land value for
each individual land and it involves many professional knowledge and adjustments in the
calculation.
Chapter 6 Specification of model
Page | 96
Chapter 6 Specification of model
6.1 Linear regression model
This chapter would specify and explain the regression model used in this dissertation. A
linear regression model is set up to investigate this effect to the property price nearby.
The sample used in this model is the properties which locate as the same sub-districts of
the land sites. As mentioned in previous chapter, three different market models are
adopted to calculate the abnormal return induced by the locality signaling effect and
valuation effect on the property price nearby. Under these three models, a linear
regression equation will be set up to analysis the relationship between the abnormal
return of the properties nearby during the event window and the performance of land
auctions. The models are as follow:





,where tY represents the cumulative abnormal return of the sample under market return
model, tR is the observed return of sample with t running from 1 to 6 and is the
cumulative regional return of properties with t running from 1 to 6
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Linear regression model
pt RY 11  
,where 1 is the constant term, 1 is the coefficient of pR and pR is the relative
performance of the land auctions.









, where tDC3 represents the cumulative abnormal return of the sample under constant
return model, t represents the mouth number which running from 1 to 6 and 3R is the
return of sample during the estimation period.
Linear regression model
pt RDC 223  
,where 2 is the constant term, 2 is the coefficient of pR and pR is the relative
performance of the land auctions.
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, where tDY3 represents the cumulative abnormal return of sample under modified
constant return model, t represents the mouth number which running from 1 to 6, 3R is
the return of sample during the estimation period and 3M is the regional market return
during the estimation period.
Linear regression model
pt RDY 333  
,where 3 is the constant term, 3 is the coefficient of pR and pR is the relative
performance of the land auction.
6.2 Dependent variable
6.2.1 Cumulative abnormal return of the properties nearby
As defined by Brown and Warner ((Stephen J. Brown, 1980), abnormal return of an asset
equals to the difference between its observed return and its expected return generated by
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a particular market model. The cumulative abnormal return of the properties which fall
within the same sub-district of the site will be examined during the event window and it
is calculated for each month during the event window. The event window is defined as
six months after the event month. Cumulative abnormal return of the sample for each
month during the event window is calculated, so t is running from 1 to 6 with the event
month defined as month 0. For example, 3R represents the cumulative abnormal return
experienced by the sample during the period of three months after the land auction month.
6.3 Independent variable
6.3.1 Relative performance pR
As mentioned in previous chapter, it is the ratio between the winning bids and the
average pre-auction forecasts of the land values. The relative performance of each parcel
of land is calculated.
Relative Performance ratio ( pR ) = ForecastsMarketAverage
BidWinning
6.4 Expected outcome
In this dissertation, a sound performance in land auction is expected to have a positive
correlation with the property price nearby. It will boost the selling price of the property
market nearby. An above market winning price would result a positive abnormal return
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on the properties nearby. In contrast, if a land auction is below market expectation, the
properties nearby would experience a negative abnormal return. Therefore, the sign of
coefficient of Rp is expected to have a positive value which indicates that there is a
positive correlation between the outcome of land auction and the abnormal return of
properties nearby.
Also, the land auction is expected to have a short term impact on the property price as the
valuation effect dominates in the impact induced by land auction. The property price
would return to its original level after a short period of time. Therefore, the abnormal
return induced by land auction on the properties nearby would diminish and become
vanish at a later stage.
6.5 Interpretation of statistics
Two statistical tests which are t-statistics and the coefficient of determination ( 2R ), will
be employed in the models to analyze the result. They are discussed as follows:
6.5.1 t-statistics
The significant relationship between the abnormal return of the sample and any
independent variable is shown from t-test. It is employed to test whether the effect of the
independent on the dependent variable is statistically significant. After estimating a
coefficient, t-test is conducted to determine how likely it is that the value of that
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coefficient is zero. T-statistic for a coefficient is the ratio of the coefficient to its standard
error and the formula is shown as follow:
t =  S/
, where  is the coefficient of independent variable derived from the regression model
and S is the standard error of that coefficient.
The value of t would determine how likely the value of coefficient  is different from
zero. A high value of t would imply that the value of  is likely to be different from zero.
From the formula, it can be seen that there is no relationship between the value of t and
the magnitude of the coefficient. A coefficient with a high t-statistic can influence the
dependent variable significantly, but the magnitude of effect could be small if the value
of coefficient is small.
After obtaining the t-values of each independent variable, they are compared with a
critical value of t according to the desired significant level. The critical value of t is
checked against the T-distribution table. This table demonstrates the probability that the
null hypothesis, in which the coefficient of the independent variable being tested equals
to one, is rejected. The following formula is adopted to determine the significant level of
the coefficient.
dfpTt ,1
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Where t = absolute value of t-statistic obtained from regression
p = desired probability that the coefficient equals to zero
df = degree of freedom
dfpT ,1 = critical t for a given p and df
When the desired probability p is having a low value, the critical value of t will be higher.
If the absolute value of t-statistic is larger than the critical value t for a 5% probability of
“zero effect”, then the independent variable is said to be significant at 5% level or at 95%
confidence level. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 95% confidence
level, it would imply that the corresponding independent variable would influence the
dependent variable significantly.
6.5.2. Coefficient of determination ( 2R )
The fitness of the functional form to the model is determined by 2R . Coefficient of
determination 2R reveals the extent of movement in the dependent variable that can be
explained by the variation in the independent variables. The value of 2R ranges from 0 to
1. Take an example; suppose 2R of a regression model is 0.9, it implies that 90% of
variation in the dependent variable is attributed to the variation in the independent
variables.
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Chapter 7 Data and Source
Repeat sales index is utilized in this dissertation to examine the change in property price
in response to the result of land auctions. The index is constructed based on the actual
transactions registered in Land Registry of HKSAR. Transaction records are extracted
from the electronic form of the Economic Property Research Centre (EPRC). EPRC is
established in 1991 and it is now widely used by surveyors and scholars in examining the
property market. Those transaction records shown in EPRC are obtained directly from
land registry and it is being revised twice a day. It should be reliable and accurate. EPRC
not only provides the transaction price, but also other useful information which are listed
below:
 Property types (eg. Commercial, Office, Industrial and Residential)
 Property address
 Property details ( eg. gross floor area, age)
 Transaction dates ( on which the Sale and Purchase Agreement is signed)
 Transaction type ( Sale and Purchase agreement, Provisional Sale and Purchase
agreement , Sub-sale)
Transaction records from beginning of 1992 to 2006 are extracted to construct the index.
A well developed repeat sales index for Hong Kong property market is obtained from the
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Department of Real Housing and Construction of The University of Hong Kong. In the
process of extracting this data, the records need to match with the following criteria:
 Property type: Residential
 Transaction type: Sale and Purchase Agreement,
 Transaction price: larger than zero but smaller than $100 million
 Transaction date: after building completion
The first two criteria ensure that only residential properties and those transactions which
are fully completed are taken into consideration. The third criterion is used to exclude
non-arm’s length transactions and bulk purchases. Pre-sales take place before the
completion of the building. The last condition is to discard all pre-sales transactions.
However, every transaction may involve more than one agreement, such as the
Assignment and Sale and Purchase Agreement. In order to avoid double counting, those
repeated transactions will be deleted. In between 1st July 1991 and 31st July 2006, there
were approximately 1.5 million transactions of private residential properties that took
place.
In order to construct the index, repeat sales pairs should be extracted from the data. Two
transaction records are regarded as repeat sales pairs if their addresses are the same. The
addresses shown in EPRC do not always have a consistent format39, so manual checks are
carried out to standardize the format of all addresses. After standardizing and matching
39 Street may be expressed as “St”, Garden becomes “Gdn”
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the addresses, approximately 430,000 repeat sales pairs of completed private residential
properties transactions within the period 1st July 1991 to 31st July 2006.
This paper aims to study the impact of land auction amongst nearby residential property
prices. Therefore, the changes in price level of the properties near the land sites sold in
the public auctions should be closely monitored. HKSAR is divided into 18 districts. In
order to provide a clearer observation of the change in property price, each district is
further divided into a number of sub-districts40. The transactions records within each sub-
district are obtained and a sub-district index is constructed. The sub-district index is used
because the impact of land auction is believed to affect mainly the surrounding area. A
regional index may not reflect the result of land auctions since the impact of it will be
outweighed by other environmental factors. The sub-district index available from
Department of Real Housing and Construction covers the period of 1st July 1991 to 31st
June 2005.
A total of 104 land auction results will be extracted to evaluate the impact of land
auctions to properties price nearby. The period of investigation started from January 1997
to October 2004. Those land auction results are obtained from Lands Department and the
information available contains the auction date, address of the site, the size of the site and
the winning bid price. Other vital information such as plot ratio, buildable floor area,
identity of the winner, starting bid as well as market estimates from various surveyors are
obtained from local newspapers. Newspapers would report the detail of the land sites
40 There are in total 56 sub-districts, such as Tai Po, Kwun Tong, Aberdeen, Repulse Bay and Kenndy Town. See
Appendix
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which would be available for auction before the auction date. Developers and home
owners can estimate the development potential of the land sites from all this information
and they evaluate the performance of the land auctions by making reference to the market
estimates.
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Chapter 8 The empirical results and analysis
In this chapter, all the statistical results of the linear regression models would be shown
and discussed. It is found that most of the results conform to what were expected, there
are still some divergent results and they would be addressed with possible explanation.
As mentioned before, three linear equations are set up to investigate the impact brought
by the outcomes of land auctions on the property prices nearby
8.1 Regression models and results
I. Market return model
pt RY 11  
, where tY represents the cumulative abnormal return of the sample under market return
model, 1 is the constant term, 1 is the coefficient of pR and pR is the relative




Date: 04/10/08 Time: 01:41
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.023377 0.023733 -0.985015 0.3269
RP 0.024637 0.021110 1.167095 0.2459
R-squared 0.013714 Mean dependent var 0.003633
Adjusted R-squared 0.004044 S.D. dependent var 0.043849
S.E. of regression 0.043760 Akaike info criterion -3.401154
Sum squared resid 0.195323 Schwarz criterion -3.350301
Log likelihood 178.8600 F-statistic 1.418267
Durbin-Watson stat 2.064092 Prob(F-statistic) 0.236453




Date: 04/10/08 Time: 01:41
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.069971 0.027936 -2.504720 0.0138
RP 0.066186 0.026301 2.516495 0.0134
R-squared 0.082270 Mean dependent var 0.002590
Adjusted R-squared 0.073272 S.D. dependent var 0.048094
S.E. of regression 0.046299 Akaike info criterion -3.288352
Sum squared resid 0.218646 Schwarz criterion -3.237499
Log likelihood 172.9943 F-statistic 9.143749
Durbin-Watson stat 1.811643 Prob(F-statistic) 0.003157
Dependent Variable: Y3
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/10/08 Time: 01:41
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.004350 0.035168 -0.123691 0.9018
RP 0.010277 0.032185 0.319325 0.7501
R-squared 0.001022 Mean dependent var 0.006917
Adjusted R-squared -0.008772 S.D. dependent var 0.067001
S.E. of regression 0.067294 Akaike info criterion -2.540451
Sum squared resid 0.461904 Schwarz criterion -2.489597
Log likelihood 134.1034 F-statistic 0.104363
Durbin-Watson stat 1.920254 Prob(F-statistic) 0.747317
Dependent Variable: Y4
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/10/08 Time: 01:41
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.004094 0.030934 -0.132330 0.8950
RP 0.008952 0.028539 0.313691 0.7544
R-squared 0.001405 Mean dependent var 0.005721
Adjusted R-squared -0.008386 S.D. dependent var 0.049788
S.E. of regression 0.049996 Akaike info criterion -3.134694
Sum squared resid 0.254962 Schwarz criterion -3.083840
Log likelihood 165.0041 F-statistic 0.143463
Durbin-Watson stat 1.724006 Prob(F-statistic) 0.705649




Date: 04/10/08 Time: 01:42
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.026921 0.039011 -0.690093 0.4917
RP 0.022093 0.034280 0.644499 0.5207
R-squared 0.004584 Mean dependent var -0.002700
Adjusted R-squared -0.005175 S.D. dependent var 0.068012
S.E. of regression 0.068188 Akaike info criterion -2.514049
Sum squared resid 0.474261 Schwarz criterion -2.463195
Log likelihood 132.7305 F-statistic 0.469726
Durbin-Watson stat 1.704948 Prob(F-statistic) 0.494668
Dependent Variable: Y6
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/10/08 Time: 01:42
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.004733 0.032065 0.147615 0.8829
RP 0.001383 0.027834 0.049673 0.9605
R-squared 0.000020 Mean dependent var 0.006249
Adjusted R-squared -0.009784 S.D. dependent var 0.065226
S.E. of regression 0.065545 Akaike info criterion -2.593126
Sum squared resid 0.438203 Schwarz criterion -2.542272
Log likelihood 136.8425 F-statistic 0.001991
Durbin-Watson stat 1.685415 Prob(F-statistic) 0.964498
II. Constant return model
pt RDC 223  
,where tDC3 represents the cumulative abnormal return of the sample under constant
return model, 2 is the constant term, 2 is the coefficient of pR and pR is the relative
performance of the land auctions.





Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:13
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.054045 0.034747 -1.555387 0.1230
RP 0.051299 0.032056 1.600309 0.1126
R-squared 0.032348 Mean dependent var 0.002195
Adjusted R-squared 0.022861 S.D. dependent var 0.059448
S.E. of regression 0.058765 Akaike info criterion -2.811510
Sum squared resid 0.352235 Schwarz criterion -2.760656
Log likelihood 148.1985 F-statistic 3.409751
Durbin-Watson stat 1.677939 Prob(F-statistic) 0.067712
Dependent Variable: DC32
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:14
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.064373 0.027989 -2.299924 0.0235
RP 0.060548 0.025949 2.333355 0.0216
R-squared 0.078319 Mean dependent var 0.002007
Adjusted R-squared 0.069283 S.D. dependent var 0.045094
S.E. of regression 0.043503 Akaike info criterion -3.412914
Sum squared resid 0.193039 Schwarz criterion -3.362060
Log likelihood 179.4715 F-statistic 8.667386
Durbin-Watson stat 1.260071 Prob(F-statistic) 0.004012
Dependent Variable: DC33
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:16
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.025616 0.022833 -1.121898 0.2645
RP 0.022616 0.020799 1.087360 0.2794
R-squared 0.013426 Mean dependent var -0.000822
Adjusted R-squared 0.003753 S.D. dependent var 0.040681
S.E. of regression 0.040605 Akaike info criterion -3.550815
Sum squared resid 0.168173 Schwarz criterion -3.499961
Log likelihood 186.6424 F-statistic 1.388051
Durbin-Watson stat 1.389586 Prob(F-statistic) 0.241476




Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:17
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.018272 0.023091 -0.791281 0.4306
RP 0.014832 0.021345 0.694882 0.4887
R-squared 0.007144 Mean dependent var -0.002011
Adjusted R-squared -0.002590 S.D. dependent var 0.036575
S.E. of regression 0.036622 Akaike info criterion -3.757289
Sum squared resid 0.136800 Schwarz criterion -3.706435
Log likelihood 197.3790 F-statistic 0.733955
Durbin-Watson stat 1.022037 Prob(F-statistic) 0.393613
Dependent Variable: DC35
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:17
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.020082 0.020434 -0.982744 0.3281
RP 0.014409 0.018957 0.760044 0.4490
R-squared 0.007336 Mean dependent var -0.004285
Adjusted R-squared -0.002396 S.D. dependent var 0.035063
S.E. of regression 0.035105 Akaike info criterion -3.841922
Sum squared resid 0.125698 Schwarz criterion -3.791069
Log likelihood 201.7800 F-statistic 0.753782
Durbin-Watson stat 0.985764 Prob(F-statistic) 0.387320
Dependent Variable: DC36
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:17
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.011221 0.020463 -0.548351 0.5846
RP 0.008043 0.019261 0.417587 0.6771
R-squared 0.002390 Mean dependent var -0.002403
Adjusted R-squared -0.007391 S.D. dependent var 0.034292
S.E. of regression 0.034419 Akaike info criterion -3.881384
Sum squared resid 0.120835 Schwarz criterion -3.830530
Log likelihood 203.8319 F-statistic 0.244329
Durbin-Watson stat 0.938387 Prob(F-statistic) 0.622160
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III. Modified constant return model
pt RDY 333  
, where tDY3 represents the cumulative abnormal return of sample under modified
constant return model, 3 is the constant term, 3 is the coefficient of pR and pR is




Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:18
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.043574 0.030162 -1.444679 0.1516
RP 0.045548 0.027130 1.678905 0.0962
R-squared 0.031643 Mean dependent var 0.006362
Adjusted R-squared 0.022149 S.D. dependent var 0.053368
S.E. of regression 0.052774 Akaike info criterion -3.026547
Sum squared resid 0.284081 Schwarz criterion -2.975693
Log likelihood 159.3804 F-statistic 3.333031
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013101 Prob(F-statistic) 0.070827
Dependent Variable: DY32
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:18
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.055183 0.020591 -2.679992 0.0086
RP 0.054004 0.019718 2.738782 0.0073
R-squared 0.101539 Mean dependent var 0.004024
Adjusted R-squared 0.092731 S.D. dependent var 0.035323
S.E. of regression 0.033646 Akaike info criterion -3.926821
Sum squared resid 0.115467 Schwarz criterion -3.875967
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Log likelihood 206.1947 F-statistic 11.52749
Durbin-Watson stat 1.609949 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000978
Dependent Variable: DY33
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:18
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.021647 0.017272 -1.253275 0.2130
RP 0.024337 0.016200 1.502275 0.1361
R-squared 0.024092 Mean dependent var 0.005034
Adjusted R-squared 0.014524 S.D. dependent var 0.032680
S.E. of regression 0.032442 Akaike info criterion -3.999677
Sum squared resid 0.107354 Schwarz criterion -3.948824
Log likelihood 209.9832 F-statistic 2.518022
Durbin-Watson stat 1.850502 Prob(F-statistic) 0.115647
Dependent Variable: DY34
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:18
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.021220 0.014104 -1.504553 0.1355
RP 0.023150 0.013688 1.691222 0.0938
R-squared 0.040294 Mean dependent var 0.004159
Adjusted R-squared 0.030885 S.D. dependent var 0.024037
S.E. of regression 0.023663 Akaike info criterion -4.630805
Sum squared resid 0.057111 Schwarz criterion -4.579951
Log likelihood 242.8019 F-statistic 4.282504
Durbin-Watson stat 1.605968 Prob(F-statistic) 0.041034
Dependent Variable: DY35
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:18
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.025581 0.012370 -2.068060 0.0412
RP 0.025330 0.011956 2.118690 0.0365
R-squared 0.048799 Mean dependent var 0.002189
Adjusted R-squared 0.039473 S.D. dependent var 0.023899
S.E. of regression 0.023423 Akaike info criterion -4.651184
Sum squared resid 0.055959 Schwarz criterion -4.600331
Log likelihood 243.8616 F-statistic 5.232851
Durbin-Watson stat 1.665974 Prob(F-statistic) 0.024229




Date: 04/29/08 Time: 20:19
Sample: 1 104
Included observations: 104
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.030450 0.037466 -0.812740 0.4183
RP 0.033467 0.033770 0.991032 0.3240
R-squared 0.007194 Mean dependent var 0.006241
Adjusted R-squared -0.002540 S.D. dependent var 0.082241
S.E. of regression 0.082346 Akaike info criterion -2.136741
Sum squared resid 0.691641 Schwarz criterion -2.085887
Log likelihood 113.1105 F-statistic 0.739090
Durbin-Watson stat 1.656310 Prob(F-statistic) 0.391969
8.2 Analysis of the results
I. Market return model
Under market return models, the coefficient of relative performance ( pR ) is positive and
it matched with our hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between the cumulative
abnormal return of the sample and the relative performance of land auction. However,
only the model of abnormal return 2Y is having a statistically significant result for the
coefficient of pR . It indicates that there is a significant positive correlation between the
cumulative abnormal return of the properties nearby during the first two months after the
event month, and the outcome of land auction. In that model, the coefficient of pR is
relative large and it implies that the effect of the land auction is stronger in magnitude
during first two months after the land auction.
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The abnormal returns induced by land auctions are statistically significant at less than 5%
level under the model of 2Y . As shown from the graph below, the p-value of the
coefficient of pR rises dramatically after 2Y . The coefficient of pR is statistically
insignificant under model 3Y , 4Y , 5Y and 6Y and their values are smaller magnitude
compared with that of model 2Y . It can be concluded that the impact induced by land
auction vanishes after two months.
In addition, the regression coefficient under 4Y is insignificant with p-value at 75.44%
while the coefficient under 6Y is insignificant with the highest p-value at 96.05%. The
increase of p-value implies that the impact from land auction is weakening after two
months of the event month. Therefore, the results imply that land auction outcome has a
positive and short-term impact on nearby property prices. The lack of a longer term
impact suggests that land auction outcome has no signaling effect and the valuation effect
is the dominant impact brought by land auction.
Chapter 8 The empirical results and analysis
Page | 116
Figure 7. Value of Coefficient of Rp under market return model
Figure 8. P-value of coefficient of Rp under market return model
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II. constant return model
The results under constant return model are satisfactory as all results matched with our
expected outcome. The coefficient of pR under model 32DC is significant at 5% level
and it is consistent with the other two models that the abnormal return experienced by the
sample occurs during the first two months after the land auction. Moreover, the p-value
of the coefficient rises noticeably after the model 32DC and it matched with the
hypothesis that the impact induced by land auction is short-lasting.
In addition, all the coefficient of pR is having a positive value and it implies that the
abnormal returns experienced by the properties nearby correlate with the performance of
land auctions positively. The p-value of the coefficient of pR is under a rising trend after
the model 32DC and it indicates that the impacts brought by land auctions to the property
nearby are diminishing. As shown from the graph below, the effect induced by land
auctions is short lasting as all the coefficients of pR rest on a relatively high p-value after
32DC .
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Figure 9. Value of Coefficient of Rp under constant return model
Figure 10. p-value of Coefficient of Rp under constant return model
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III. Modified constant return model
The results under modified constant return model are similar to that of market return
model. All the coefficient of pR is having a positive value and it implies that the
abnormal returns experienced by the properties nearby correlate with the performance of
land auctions positively. There are two models, 31DY and 35DY , are having statistically
significant results for the coefficient of pR . The coefficient of pR under model 32DY is
having the highest value with the lowest in p-value. This further strengthens our
conclusion that there is a significant positive correlation between the cumulative
abnormal return of the properties nearby during the first two months after the event
month, and the outcome of land auction. In another words, it is likely that the abnormal
return experienced by the properties nearby during the first two month is induced by the
outcome of land auction.
It is worthwhile to offer explanation for the phenomena that the coefficient of pR is
statistically significant under the model of 31DY .
41 The result under model 31DY indicates
that the abnormal return experienced by the sample is positively correlated with the
outcome of land auction during the first month after the auction month. It implies that
there are some investors can reasonably anticipate the outcome of land auction.
A normal property transaction normally takes two month to complete, starting from
negotiation on price to completion of assignment. Therefore, a transaction record shown
41 At 10% confidence level
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in the EPRC is about two month late relative to the time when negotiation between the
two parties is started. The abnormal return experienced by the properties nearby at the
first month after land auction is calculated by the actual transactions from EPRC at the
same period of time. Therefore, it is likely that the negotiation is started one month
before the land auctions and the completion of transaction is shown as a record in EPRC
one month after the land auction. A significant abnormal return of model 31DY implies
that the market can foresee the result of land auction and the change in general price level
due to land auction take place before the auction is held.
However, the result under model 35DY is significant under 5% level. It implies that the
results of land auctions would continue to influence the property market nearby after five
months and it is inconsistent with the results under the other two models. 35DY is
significant under 5% level would suggest that the impact brought by land auctions is
rather long lasting and it doesn’t not matched with the results shown in other models.
All in all, the results under modified constant return model are not satisfactory, but it still
provides a good indicator on the relationship between the abnormal return experienced by
the sample and outcome of land auctions. In addition, the overall results under the model
consistent with the other models despite the fact that the coefficient of 35DY is significant
at 5% level.
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Figure 11. Value of coefficient of Rp under Modified return model
Figure 12. p-value of coefficient of Rp under Modified return model
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8.3 Summary
To conclude, all the three models arrives similar result that there is a positive correlation
between the abnormal return experienced by the properties nearby and the outcome of
land auction. Results under models 2Y , 32DY and 32DC are statistically significant and
they implies that the abnormal return experience by the sample during the first two month
is induced by valuation effect which is short lasting and the effect would vanish after two
months of land auctions.
All the results shown under the three models suggested that impacts brought by land
auction are lack of a longer term impact and it indicates that the land auction outcome
contains no signaling effect and the valuation effect is the dominant impact brought by
land auction.
As mentioned before, a normal property transaction takes two months to complete,
starting from negotiating of price to completion of assignment. A transaction record
shown in the EPRC is about two month late relative to the time when negotiation
between the two parties is started. The abnormal return experienced by the properties
nearby is statistically significant during the period 2 and it is calculated based on the
transaction records. It gives rise to the fact that the negotiation started between buyers
and sellers after the outcome of land auction is heard and the completion of transaction is
shown as a record under EPRC after two months of the land auction.
Chapter 8 The empirical results and analysis
Page | 123
Therefore, the sellers and buyers investment decisions are influenced by the outcome of
land auctions for a short duration of time after the land auction. The transactions which
are influenced by the land auctions are shown as a transaction records after two months.
Those influenced transaction are having a significant positive correlation with the
outcome of land auctions and the correlation is supported by the statistically significant
results under 32DY , 2Y and 32DC . The results given by all the three models are sensible




9.1 Summary of findings
This section provides a short summary of the study including a review of results and
implications.
It is generally believed that the result of land auction influences the property prices
nearby for two possible reasons. Firstly, since the developers in Hong Kong expected to
possess superior information and they are believed to be better informed about the future
prospect of development in different locations. Due to this possibility of asymmetric
information, any important investment decision by developers could be interpreted as a
result of private information. This is especially the case in Hong Kong since most
developers are large in size and very experienced in property development. A Land
auction is a public event and developer’s behavior could be interpreted as a signal of their
views towards the future vista of the locality of the auctioned site. Land auction results
would reflect developers’ expectation about future property prices, particularly in the
locality of the auctioned site. If the land auction outcome is better than market’s
expectation, the market would view that the developers are optimistic about the future
property prices of the developed property, this would have a positive impact on the prices
of nearby properties. If the developer’s optimism is interpreted as signals about future
property prices in the locality of the auctioned site, the auction outcome would have a
positive impact on prices of nearby properties that would sustain for some time and will
not die out quickly.
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Secondly, a land auction can also be view as a bulk purchase of real estate assets. The
auction price can be easily converted to comparable property prices using a "reverse
residential valuation". It can be treated as a rich source of comparables which affect the
current valuation of properties in that district. An better than expected winning price
would influence prospective buyers’ and sellers’ valuation of properties in the same way
as a large volume of properties transacted at above the then market prices in the second
hand market. Sellers will tend to ask for a price higher than the pre-auction second hand
market price levels while buyers will be more willing to buy at higher prices resulting in
a upward adjustment in the prices of second hand properties. This valuation effect would
have a positive but short term impact on prices of nearby properties since other more up-
to-date market comparables will arrive rendering the price information in the auction
price obsolete as time goes by.
In this study, event study methodology is adopted to test the impact of land auction on
excess returns on properties in the vicinity of the auctioned site. The excess return of an
asset is defined as the observed return in excess of a benchmark normal return. Three
different models are undertaken to estimate the normal returns, i.e maket return model,
constant return model and modifies constant return model. Monthly repeat sales indices
are used in this dissertation to track the changes in the general price level of the
properties and prices in specific locality of the auctioned sites. The large volume of




The outcome of land auction is measure by a ratio of the winning bid to the mean value
of the forecasts by surveyors reported in major newspapers. Analysis of land auction
outcomes during the period 1995-2005 shows that land auction outcome has a positive
impact to the nearby property price shortly after the auction. The results also suggest that
the positive impact induced by land auction was very short lasting as the cumulative
abnormal return after the auction date vanished two months after the auction month. The
lack of a longer term impact suggests that land auction outcome has no signaling effect.
That is, the real estate market does not perceive the winning bids containing information
about future real estate prices despite the fact that most developers in Hong Kong are
very experienced and large in size and that the auctioned land have to be developed
within a relative short time horizon. To summarize this, the valuation effect dominates in
the impact induced by land auctions and it lasts for a short period of time.
One of the practical implications is that a land auction outcome would provide an
additional mean for the developers to boost up their sales of new properties in the vicinity
of the auction site. They can create a flourishing atmosphere for the property market by
overbidding intentionally in land auction. The positive, despite short term, valuation
effect induced from sound performance in land auction would then boost up the property
prices nearby and attract potential buyers to purchase properties in anticipation to the
potential growth in property prices.
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9.2 Implications from findings
From literatures review, it is noticeable that event study methodology is rarely applied to
study the impact of certain events on the property market. The outcome of land auction
raises public concern and it influences the investment decisions of the potential buyers.
The developers signal the market through the public auctions and their view on the future
prospect of the real estate market is reflected upon the outcome of land auctions. It is
believed that the impact induced from land auctions will therefore influence the property
price nearby. This dissertation provides an empirical evidence to sustain this concept
which is generally known to everyone.
This study would provide some hinters on the bidding strategy of the developers in the
public auction. According to the result, a sound performance in a land auction will induce
a positive valuation effect on the property market nearby. This will build up the
confidence of the investors and further strengthen the purchasing incentive of the
potential buyers. After acquiring this phenomenon, developers may intentionally over bid
in the land auction to create a sound performance. They do so because they may have
some new residential properties in the nearby area, and a sound performance in land
auction may enable them to sell the units at a higher price after the release of positive
news from the land auctions. The short term valuation effect induced may also boost up
sales for the development which is located nearby. The developers may still earn huge
profit in selling the properties in high price even though they spend abnormal high price
for that piece of the land.
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Moreover, this dissertation concludes that the valuation effect is the dominate impact
brought by the land auction as the abnormal return experienced by the properties nearby
is short lasting. The general property price nearby would return to their original level
after a short duration of time. Therefore, the investors and potential buyers should be
aware of this short term valuation effect resulted from land auction when they make their
investment decisions. The general property price nearby would increase if a sound
performance of land auction is acknowledged. As a result, they should purchase the
properties after two months of the event month to avoid suffering from purchasing the
properties at a relatively higher price after the land auction.
9.3 Limitations of study
The fact that only 104 parcels of lands are used in the analysis is the first limitation of
this dissertation. This small sample size may lead to bias in the study and a larger sample
size would further affirm the results given by this research. Moreover, pre-auction market
estimates given by different surveyors should be collected as many as possible in order to
deduce a general market estimate on the true value of land site. This dissertation only
studies the pre-auction forecasts made by surveyors three days before the land auction
takes place and only seven local newspapers were included within a data base. In order to
achieve a more generalized result, the duration of collecting market estimates should be




In this dissertation, repeat sale index was used to evaluate the abnormal return
experienced by the properties nearby during the event window. The major assumption
adopted in the repeat sale methodology is that the quality of a property does not change
much over time and the change in price between the two sales reflects purely the
appreciation of property value. However, this assumption is not realistic in nature as the
quality of a flat could change continuously over time. Despite this drawback accompany
with repeat sale model, it still provides us with an insight into the current situation of the
market.
The price of properties nearby may react differently if the land site sold in a public
auction is has different intensities of development.42 The property price may not be
influenced or by subjected to a less significant impact if the development intensity of the
site is different from the private housing nearby. To illustrate this concepts, suppose the
land site is having the use of R3 which restrict intensive development, but the properties
nearby are all 30 to 40 storeys private residential housing estate.
Alternatively, a sound performance of the land auction may not boost up the property
price nearby. It is because the impact brought by land auction will be smaller as the price
of the land site can not reflect the valuation of the developers on the “true market price”
of the properties nearby due to the difference in development intensities. The price of
land site cannot provide a benchmark on the true value of the properties nearby which is
undergoing an intensive development.
42 Details of Land use designations can be found in Appendix 3
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In order to tackle this problem, the land sites can be categorized according to its
permissible intensity of development. For example, land site with the use of R1 can be
classified as high intensity while the use of R2 and R3 can be categorized as low intensity
residential development. If the land site under auction is having a low intensity
development, only the residential housing nearby with low development intensity should
be treated as sample to investigate the impact of the land auction.
9.4 Further area of study
Further investigation can be made to examine the relationship between the size of the
land site and the abnormal return experienced by the properties nearby. The size of land
site is measured in term of its allowable buildable floor area. A large and valuable land
site would require the developers to invest a large amount of capital in both acquiring and
developing of land site. A large land site with sound performance in land auction would
considerably indicate that the developers are confident towards the future prospect of the
real estate market. This would further intensify the signaling effect and valuation effect
induced from the outcome of land auction. Therefore, it is expected that the abnormal
return experienced by the properties nearby are greater in magnitude if a large land site is
having a sound performance in public auction.
Furthermore, this dissertation can also study the relationship between the competitiveness
of bidding during the auctions and the abnormal return experienced by the properties
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nearby. A competitive auction would imply that the developers are confident about the
future vista of the property market and hence, they are keen to acquire land site for
development. Therefore, it is expected that a keen competition would drive up the
property price nearby. The degree of competitiveness can be observed from the number
of bidders during the auction or the numbers of bids taken to reach the winning price.
Moreover, as explained by Ching and Fu (2003), the size of the winner, measured by its
market capitalization would also influence the abnormal return estimates. It is because
the market would be more significantly driven by the signaling effect if a large and
traditional developer actively participates in the land auction and wins the land at an
above market price. It is because they are expected to more conservative in bidding as
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Appendix 1. Procedure for Land Sale under the Application List System
Source: Procedure for Land Sale under the Application System. Practice Note of Lands
Department Issue No. 5/2005. HKSAR Government
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Appendix 3. Land Use Designations
LAND USE DESIGNATIONS
The following table illustrates the relationship between land use designations of the Elko
City Master Plan and zoning district classifications of the Elko City Zoning Ordinance.
Typically, land use designations associated with the Master Plan are more generalized
and schematic. Zoning district classifications are more comprehensive and specific with
district boundaries following a more definitive boundary, such as a property line or a
center line of a street.
Master Plan Land Use Designations Zoning District Classifications
AGRICULTURAL A (General Agricultural)
LOW DENSITY RESIDENTIAL RS (Residential Suburban)
HR (Hillside Residential)
R1 (Single Family Residential)
R2 (Two Family Residential)
HIGH DENSITY RESIDENTIAL R (Single Family and Multiple Family
Residential)
R3 (Multiple Family Residential)
RMH (Mobile Home Park and Mobile
Home Subdivision Residential)
RO (Residential Office)











Appendix 4. Details of the land sites
Site no. Auction Date
Land
Applicant Location District Use
Area
(sq m.)
1 25/01/1995 Nil KAU TO Shatin R3 6,500
2
22/02/1995
Nil ADJ. NO.7, STANLEY MAIN ST Stanley R1 211
3
22/02/1995
Nil 9 COX'S RD & 1-6 COX'S PATH Yau Tsim Mong R2 4,126
4
14/03/1995
Nil FUNG SHING ST, NGAU CHI WAN Ngau Chi Wan R1 13,999
5
14/03/1995
Nil AREA 90, MA ON SHAN Ma On Shan R2 10,900
6 27/03/1995 Nil CHUNG HAU ST, HOMANTIN Homantin R1 3,380
7 27/03/1995 Nil MA ON SHAN TOWN CENTRE Ma On Shan C/R 10,306
8
27/03/1995
Nil TOWN PARK RD, YUEN LONG Yuen Long R2 2,155
9
27/03/1995
Nil AREA 37C, TSEUNG KWAN O Tseung Kwan O R1 5,970
10 30/03/1995 Nil KING'S PARK RISE Homantin R2 15,644
11
30/03/1995
Nil SHA HA, SAI KUNG Sai Kung R3 900
12
30/03/1995
Nil TOWN PARK RD NORTH Yuen Long R2 16,301
13 28/06/1995 Nil AREA 30, TAI PO Tai Po R3 26,310
14
28/06/1995
Nil SHAUKEIWAN MAIN ST EAST Shaukeiwan R1 1,296
15 26/09/1995 Nil LAI CHI SHAN, AREA 37, TAI PO Tai Po R3 15,300
16
27/11/1995





Nil WO TIK ST Tsuen Wan C/R 572
18
19/12/1995
Nil GL NEAR 42 STUBBS RD Mid-level R2 3,045
19
19/12/1995




CDA SITE IN HUNG HOM BAY
RECLAMATION Hung Hom C/R 15,073
21 18/03/1996 Nil TAI PO OLD MARKET Tai Po R1 466
22
18/03/1996
Nil HONG MAN ST, CHAI WAN Chai Wan C/R 1,591
23 14/08/1996 Nil SHEK O HEADLAND Shek O R3 276
24 14/08/1996 Nil AREA 30 (SITE 1) Tai Po R3 21,200
25
13/11/1996
Nil J/O MA TIN RD/TAI YUK RD Yuen Long C/R 4,206
26 11/12/1996 Nil TSEUK LUK ST San Po Kong C/R 222
27 15/01/1997 Nil SOUTH BAY RD Repulse Bay R3 2,008
28 15/01/1997 Nil 18 1/2 MS CASTLE PEAK RD Tuen Mun R3 5,080
29 25/03/1997 Nil CHUNG HAU ST, HOMANTIN Homantin R1 2,627
30 25/03/1997 Nil SIU SAI WAN RECLAMATION Siu Sai Wan R1 25,592
31 03/06/1997 Nil PENDRAGON 150 WONG MA KOK, Stanley R3 53,126
32 03/06/1997 Nil WAN HOI ST, HUNG HOM Hung Hom R1 7,402
33 03/06/1997 Nil CHEUNG FU ST, CHEUNG SHA Island R4 2,240
34 27/08/1997 Nil 129 REPULSE BAY RD Repulse Bay R3 10,570




MEI WO CIRCUIT, AREA 41A, SHA
TIN Shatin R4 1,307
37 15/09/1997 Nil HUNG SHING ST/WAI FUNG ST, Ap Lei Chau C/R 400
38 15/09/1997 Nil CHUK KOK, Sai kung Sai Kung R4 1,570
39 14/10/1997 Nil SHUEN WAN, Tai Po Tai Po R3 91,265
40 14/10/1997 Nil AREA 16, TUEN MUN, N.T. Tuen Mun R1 1,687
41 19/11/1997 Nil 4 CAPE DRIVE, CHUNG HOM KOK Stanley R3 3,189
42 19/11/1997 Nil BULKELEY ST, HUNG HOM Hung Hom R1 693
43 11/12/1997 Nil AREA 10, TUEN MUN Tuen Mun R1 2,293
44 11/12/1997 Nil
SHA TSENG RD, TONG YAN SAN
TSUEN Yuen Long R3 1,950
45 13/01/1998 Nil TSING SIN ST, AREA 37B, Tuen Mun R1 3,875
46 13/01/1998 Nil PING SHAN LANE Yuen Long R3 2,040
47 12/02/1998 Nil SUI WO RD,shatin Shatin R4 4,133
48 12/02/1998 Nil CHIK FU ST, Tai Wei Shatin R1 88
49 24/03/1998 Nil 6-14 MOUNT AUSTIN RD Peak R3 13,328
50 24/03/1998 Nil MA TIN RD,YUEN LONG Yuen Long R2 6,796
51 22/04/1998 Nil SHEK WU HUI, SHEUNG SHUI SHEUNG SHUI C/R 3,068
52 20/04/1999 Nil 35 & 37 CLOUD VIEW RD North Point Hill R2 2,494
53
20/04/1999
Nil 83 BROADCAST DRIVE Kowloon Tong R2 4,272
54
20/04/1999






NOS. 1-3 HOMESTEAD ROAD,THE
PEAK Peak R3 2,369
56
29/06/1999
Nil KWAI LUEN ROAD, KWAI CHUNG Kwai Chung R1 3,746
57
29/06/1999




No. 99 PEAK ROAD/NO.4 GOUGH




CASTLE PEAK ROAD, AREA 58, SIU
LAM, TUEN MUN Tuen Mun R3 16,469
60
4/8/1999 HANG KWAI STREET, AREA 16,
TUEN MUN Tuen Mun R1 4,765
61
4/8/1999
unknown SAI WAN, CHEUNG CHAU Island R4 2,130
62
14/10/1999




ADJOINING NO. 14 SOUTH BAY




HOI FAN ROAD, WEST KOWLOON
RECLAMATION Tai Kowk Tsui R1 6,943
65
13/12/1999
Nil AREA 38,TAI PO Tai Po R3 14,985
66
29/02/2000




YIU HING ROAD, SHAUKEIWAN,
HONG KONG SHAUKEIWAN R1 881




JUNCTION OF HING WAH STREET







ADJOINING NOS. 16-18 SOUTH BAY




JUNCTION OF CARMEL VILLAGE
STREET AND HAU MAN STREET,




BEAS STABLE, SHEUNG SHUI, NEW




AREA 77, MA ON SHAN, NEW




AREA 40, ROUTE TWISK, TSUEN




AREA 40, ROUTE TWISK, TSUEN




J/O FARM ROAD AND MA TAU WAI
ROAD, MA TAU WAI Kowloon City R1 2,765
77
5/10/2000




HOI FAI ROAD, WEST KOWLOON




CHUK KOK, SAI KUNG, NEW




AREA 77, MA ON SHAN, SHA TIN,




TUI MIN HOI, SAI KUNG, NEW




J/O LOK HA SQUARE, LOK LIN
PATH, AREA 43, SHA TIN Shatin R3 2,710
83 19/06/2001 Nil SZE PEI SQUARE, TSUEN WAN TSUEN WAN CR 390
84 13/08/2001 Nil
MAN KEI TOI, PAK SHA WAN, SAI
KUNG SAI KUNG R3 17,800
85 13/08/2001 Nil
OFF PING CHUK LANE, PING SHAN,
YUEN LONG Yuen Long R1 2,517
86 16/10/2001 Nil
2 & 4 CALDECOTT ROAD, PIPER'S
HILL, KOWLOON Cheung Sha Wan R3 3,297
87 16/10/2001 Nil
TAI MONG TSAI, SAI KUNG, NEW
TERRITORIES SAI KUNG R4 4,861
88 4/12/2001 Nil
3 CALDECOTT ROAD, PIPER
HILL, KOWLOON Cheung Sha Wan R3 5,872
89 4/12/2001 Nil
OFF PING CHUK LANE, PING SHAN,
YUEN LONG, NEW TERRITORIES Yuen Long R1 3,754
90 4/2/2002 Nil
HOI CHU ROAD, AREA 16, TUEN
MUN, NEW TERRITORIES Tuen Mun R1 6,090
91 4/2/2002 Nil
AREA 11, TAI PO KAU, TAI PO, NEW





HOI FAI ROAD, WEST KOWLOON
RECLAMATION, KOWLOON Tai Kowk Tsui R1 10,450
93 15/04/2002 unknown
JUNCTION OF CORNWALL STREET
AND TAT CHEE AVENUE,
KOWLOON kowloon Tong R3 14,700
94 15/04/2002 Nil
No. 2 LOK KWAI PATH, AREA 43,




CAPE ROAD, CHUNG HOM KOK,




NO. 632 KING'S ROAD, NORTH




KONG PUI STREET, AREA 5B, SHA
TIN, NEW TERRITORIES Shatin R1 1,359
98 10/9/2002 Nil SA PO ROAD, KOWLOON Kowloon City R1 2,305
99 10/9/2002 Nil
47 SHEK PAI WAN ROAD,





AREA 77, MA ON SHAN, SHA TIN,





TUNG LO WAN HILL ROAD, SHA




Holdings Ltd SA PO ROAD, KOWLOON Kowloon City R1 3,521.00
103 12/10/2004 Unknown
SHEUNG SHING STREET,
HOMANTIN, KOWLOON Homantin R1 17,756
104 12/10/2004 Unknown
JUNCTION OF KING FUK STREET,
KING TAI STREET AND PRINCE
EDWARD ROAD EAST, SAN PO
KONG, KOWLOON Wong Tai Sin R1 12,701
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Wb Dwb gfa rp
1 130 171.0 109.6 156.0 41,980 4073
Hang Tung
Resources Ltd. 168.0 1.018
2 28 53.5 109.6 48.8 9,008 5939 Eton Properties Ltd. 31.4 1.704
3 750 1020.0 109.6 930.7 222,060 4593 Eton Properties Ltd. 931.4 1.095
4 1300 1610.0 109.6 1,469.0 703,959 2287 Sun Hung Kai 1578.9 1.020
5 980 1240.0 109.6 1,131.4 586,633 2114
Hang lung Properties
Limted 1272.7 0.974








7 1000 1320.0 109.6 1,204.4 554,380 2381
Sino Groups (50%),
Wong's Family (50%) 1192.6 1.107
8 70 70.0 109.6 63.9 69,588 1006
Paliburg Holdings
Ltd 77.8 0.900
9 980 1060.0 109.6 967.2 523,201 2026
Sino Groups (50%),
Wong's Family (50%) 991.3 1.069
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Bank of East Asia
(5%) 1150.3 1.156
11 15 30.0 109.6 27.4 5,812 5161
Sheng Mao
Enterprise Co. Ltd. 18.9 1.586
12 450 465.0 109.6 424.3 526,386 900
Paliburg Holdings
Ltd 498.7 0.932
13 500 500.0 112.2 445.6 226,559 2207 Henderson Land 616.0 0.812
14 220 320.0 112.2 285.2 114,743 2293 Henderson Land 277.2 1.154




16 80 107.0 114.8 93.2 13,380 7997
Kilberg Safe &
Systems Ltd 84.0 1.274
17 72 95.0 114.8 82.8 39,500 2405
Hon Kwok Land
Investment co. Ltd. 86.3 1.101
18 550 860.0 114.8 749.1 163,880 5248
AMOY
PROPERTIES 737.8 1.166
19 170 191.0 114.8 166.4 88,802 2151
Hon Kwok Land
Investment co. Ltd. 284.0 0.673
20 3200 4725.0 115.2 4,101.6 1,478,554 3196
Henderson land
(50%), Sun Hung Kai
(50%) 4496.0 1.051
21 70.0 115.2 60.8 31,488 2546
Paliburg Holdings
Ltd 56.2 1.246
22 250 440.0 115.2 381.9 148,961 2750 Sino land Ltd. 368.2 1.195
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23 12 17.0 119.3 14.2 2,228 7630 Sino land Ltd. 19.2 0.887
24 380 535.0 119.3 448.4 182,557 2931 Henderson Land 416.7 1.284
25 180 370.0 122.6 301.8 249,003 1486 Sino land Ltd. 299.7 1.235
26 38 61.0 122.6 49.8 17,922 3404 澤成 56.3 1.084
27 135 230.0 122.3 188.1 12529 18357 Eton Properties Ltd. 177.0 1.30
28 130 258.0 122.3 211.0 71083 3629 Eton Properties Ltd. 203.5 1.27






Ltd. (20%) 1225.7 1.14










( 30%) 6494.3 0.85








33 10 40.0 125.9 31.8 9,644.00 4147 冠洋投資 25.0 1.60
34 3,000.00 5550.0 126.1 4,401.3 341,325.00 16114 Chinachem Group 4530.0 1.23








37 68 105.0 126.1 83.3 36,463.00 2880
Paliburg Holdings
Ltd. 145.0 0.72




39 3,500.00 5600.0 128.5 4,358.0 1,164,148.0 4810
Hung Kei Textile
Product Ind. Co Ltd 6316.7 0.89
40 1,500.00 2900.0 128.5 2,256.8 892,729.00 3248 Chung Sea 3052.0 0.95
41 100 221.0 128.5 172.0 25,745.00 8584
Yu Tai Hung Co.
Ltd. 192.8 1.15
42 115 276.0 128.5 214.8 67,149.00 4110
Yu Tai Hung Co.
Ltd. 215.2 1.28
43 170 285.0 128.5 221.8 135,010.00 2111
Tai Cheung
Holdings Ltd. 326.3 0.87
44 25 58.0 128.5 45.1 20,993.00 2763 正義實業 45.8 1.27
45 250 250.0 126.5 197.6 214,041.10 1168 Emperor Group 367.8 0.68
46 20 33.0 126.5 26.1 21,956.09 1503
Paliburg Holdings
Ltd 36.7 0.90
47 38 90.0 126.5 71.1 17,568.00 5123
Crystal Property
Development Ltd 74.0 1.22
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48 4.5 11.6 126.5 9.2 3,997.00 2902
San Kei Land
Development Co Ltd 8.7 1.34
49 680 920.0 126.5 727.3 121,199.00 7591 Nan Fung Group 838.6 1.10
50 180 290.0 126.5 229.2 219,462.00 1321
Headland Venture
Limited 258.4 1.12
51 190 330.0 127.8 258.2 16520 1665
Asia Standard Gp.
Ltd. 318.0 1.04
52 340.0 590.0 122.6 481.2 134,243 4395 Sino land Ltd. 447.0 1.32
53 270.0 515.0 122.6 420.1 137,000 3733
K. Wah International
Holdings Ltd 440.3 1.17
54 245.0 385.0 122.6 314.0 270,316 1424 Nan Fung Group 405.2 0.95
55 175.0 265.0 122.6 216.2 32,292 8206 Kwai Hung Group 238.8 1.11
56 275.0 470.0 122.6 383.4 220,682 2331 Sino land Ltd. 448.9 1.05




58 88.0 134.0 120.0 111.7 13,251 10113
Prudential Surveyors
International Ltd. 117.2 1.14




Investment Gp. 323.8 1.02
60 190.0 320.0 120.0 266.7 250,000 1248
K. Wah International
Holdings Ltd 323.8 0.99
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62 500.0 555.0 119.3 465.2 801,972 692
Cheung Kong
(Holdings) ltd 654.2 0.85
63 120.0 151.0 119.3 126.6 21,959 6876 怡華益新 188.0 0.80
64 960.0 1340.0 119.3 1,123.2 565,020 2372
Cheung Kong
(Holdings) ltd 1,302.4 1.03
65 110.0 152.0 119.3 127.4 96,781 1571
Emperor Group,
Jackie Chan 157.2 0.97
66 350.0 490.0 118.5 413.5 58,665 8353
Sun Hung Kai
Property Ltd. 490.7 1.00
67 110.0 170.0 118.5 143.5 75,848 2241
Asia Standard
International Ltd 147.5 1.15
68 6.0 17.2 118.5 14.5 14,553 1182
Tack Hsin Holdings
Ltd. 11.1 1.56
69 1,900.0 1900.0 117.5 1,617.0 1,556,245 1221
Cheung Kong
(Holdings) ltd 2,782.0 0.68
70 100.0 130.0 117.5 110.6 18,644 6973
Higo Force
Company Ltd. 146.7 0.89
71 230.0 251.0 117.5 213.6 137,618 1823
AMOY
PROPERTIES 240.3 1.04
72 80.0 93.0 117.5 79.1 99,000 940 Sino land Ltd. 88.0 1.06
73 650.0 865.0 116.2 744.4 612,472 1412 Sino land Ltd. 674.8 1.28












76 450.0 540.0 114.8 470.4 268,000 2016 Sun Hung Kai 447.5 1.21




78 2,580.0 2580.0 114.8 2,247.4 151,500 17030
AMOY
PROPERTIES 2,895.8 0.89
79 20.0 21.0 114.8 18.3 12,000 1750
Far East
Consortium Ltd 18.9 1.11
80 450.0 560.0 115.1 486.5 392,886 1412
K. Wah International
Holdings Ltd 495.0 1.13
81 50.0 73.5 115.1 63.9 41,500 1772 健聯發展 58.8 1.25
82 35.0 38.5 114.9 33.5 29,170 1320
Yu Tai Hung Co.
Ltd. 39.8 0.97
83 28.0 41.0 114.9 35.7 23,078 1777
Wing Kwok
Enterprises Ltd 33.5 1.22
84 140.0 148.0 114.0 129.8 115,000 1287
USI HOLDINGS
LIMITED 193.3 0.77
85 36.0 44.0 114.0 38.6 72,100 610 Sino land Ltd. 49.0 0.90
86 100.0 110.0 114.0 96.5 77,000 1400
New World
development Ltd.,
Sino land Ltd., Yu
Tai Hung Co. Ltd. 86.9 1.27
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88 120.0 170.0 114.0 149.1 83,000 2048
K. Wah International
Holdings Ltd 116.4 1.46
89 50.0 62.0 114.0 54.4 107,000 579 Sino land Ltd. 63.2 0.98
90 186.0 264.0 112.0 235.7 380,000 805 Sino land Ltd. 237.8 1.11
91 24.0 37.0 112.0 33.0 27,125 1364
Laws Real Estate
Agency Ltd. 37.7 0.98
92 1,100.0 1640.0 111.8 1,466.9 840,000 1944 Sino land Ltd. 1,311.8 1.25




Estates Group 567.3 1.00
94 420.0 660.0 111.8 590.3 436,265 1513
Nan Fung Group,
Wing Tai Asia 570.0 1.16
95 75.0 100.0 111.8 89.4 30,000 3330
Tai Cheung
Properties Ltd. 103.6 0.97
96 260.0 310.0 111.8 277.3 159,784 1981 Nan Fung Group 280.0 1.11
97 110.0 112.0 111.8 100.2 84,831 1432
Laws Real Estate
Agency Ltd. 121.0 0.93
98 290.0 290.0 110.1 263.4 223,229 1299 Chinachem Group 279.1 1.04
99 65.0 83.0 110.1 75.4 77,620 1069
Yu Tai Hung Co.
Ltd. 78.0 1.06
100 1,206.0 2090.0 100.6 2,077.5 753,000 2733
Cheung Kong
(Holdings) ltd 1,456.7 1.43
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101 469.0 865.0 100.6 859.8 260,800 3317
K. Wah International
Holdings Ltd 557.9 1.55
102 682.2 1010.0 100.6 1,004.0 341,100 2961 Chinachem Group 982.8 1.03
103 5,020.0 9420.0 99.1 9,505.5 1,720,000 5476
Cheung Kong
(Holdings) ltd 6,756.6 1.39
104 3,000.0 4700.0 99.1 4,742.7 1,230,044 3821 Sun Hung Kai 3,877.0 1.21
Appendix
Page | 159

















RICACORP Prop 190 4,526 168.0 4001.9
Cheung Hoi Tat 140 3,335
Treasure Land Property 190 4,526
Midland 180 4,288
RHL International Gp 140 3,335















Chungsen Property GP 850 3,828 931.4 4194.4
RICACORP Prop 1000 4,503
RHL International Gp 910 4,098
Treasure Land Property Consultants 842 3,792
Midland 1055 4,751















Chungsen Property GP 30 3,330 31.4 3485.8
RICACORP Prop 36 3,996
RHL International Gp 30 3,330



















Chatered Security 1200 2,046 1272.7 2169.5
RICACORP Prop 1310 2,233
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 1380 2,352
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 1050 1,790
Cheung Hoi Tat 1250 2,131
Midland 1669 2,845
Tai Fuk Security 1050 1,790


















Chatered Security 1600 2,273
RICACORP Prop 1540 2,188
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 1588 2,256
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 1500 2,131
Cheung Hoi Tat 1550 2,202
Midland 1574 2,236
Tai Fuk Security 1700 2,415















Chatered Security 82.8 1,190 77.8 1117.4
Treasure Land Property Consultants 100 1,437
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 72 1,035
Chungsen Property GP 73 1,049
RHL International Gp 70 1,006



















Chatered Security 1071 1,932 1192.6 2151.3
Treasure Land Property 1140 2,056
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 1150 2,074
Jones Lang 1220 2,201
Chungsen Property GP 1220 2,201
RHL International Gp 1300 2,345
RICACORP Prop 1220 2,201
Midland 1220 2,201















Chatered Security 843 1,611 991.3 1894.7
Treasure Land Property 950 1,816
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 850 1,625
Chungsen Property GP 1100 2,102
RHL International Gp 1050 2,007
RICACORP Prop 1100 2,102
Midland 1046 1,999















Chatered Security 850 3,115 961.7 3524.4
Treasure Land Property 1100 4,031
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 1100 4,031
Jones Lang Lasalle 1000 3,665
Chungsen Property GP 1000 3,665
RHL International Gp 900 3,298




















Treasure Land Property 560 1,064 498.7 947.3
RICACORP Prop 550 1,045
Tai Fuk Security 560 1,064
Chatered Security 246 467
Chungsen Property GP 550 1,045
Midland 526 999















Treasure Land Property 17 2,925 18.9 3254.8
RICACORP Prop 20 3,441
Tai Fuk Security 15.5 2,667
Chatered Security 26 4,474
Chungsen Property GP 20 3,441
Midland 15 2,581















Treasure Land Property 1120 4,645 1150.3 4771.0
RICACORP Prop 1130 4,687
Tai Fuk Security 1270 5,267
Chatered Security 1037 4,301



















Treasure Land Property 230 2,004 277.2 2416.0
DTZ 260 2,266
Tony T N Chan Surveyors Ltd 290 2,527
RHL International Gp 300 2,615
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 280 2,440
Chungsen Property GP 280 2,440
DUDLEY SURVEYORS LIMITED 320 2,789
Midland 265 2,310
利和集團 270 2,353















Treasure Land Property 540 2,383 616.0 2718.9
DTZ 680 3,001
Tony T N Chan Surveyors Ltd 560 2,472
RHL International group 680 3,001
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 480 2,119
Chungsen Property GP 725 3,200
DUDLEY SURVEYORS LIMITED 634 2,798
Midland 570 2,516
利和集團 675 2,979


















RHL International Gp 240 1,822
Chungsen Property GP 250 1,898
Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 233 1,768
Treasure Land Property 240 1,822



















RHL International Gp 92 2,329 86.3 2183.5
Chungsen Property GP 79 2,000
Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 85 2,152
Treasure Land Property 78 1,975
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 90 2,278
DTZ 94 2,380
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 82 2,076
RICACORP Prop 90 2,278















A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 60 4,484 84.0 6278.0
RHL International Gp 77 5,755
Chungsen Property GP 80 5,979
Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 80 5,979
Treasure Land Property 86 6,428
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 93 6,951
DTZ 90 6,726
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 90 6,726
RICACORP Prop 100 7,474















DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 310 3,491 284.0 3198.1
RICACORP Prop 250 2,815



















DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 900 1,464 737.8 1480.4
Treasure Land Property 740 1,526
RICACORP Prop 640 1,422




















DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 360 2,417 368.2 2471.8
Midland 330 2,215
Treasure Land Property Consultants 380 2,551
Dudley Surveyor Limited 357 2,397
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 414 2,779















DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 52 1,651 56.2 1784.8
Midland 49 1,556
Treasure Land Property Consultants 55 1,747
Dudley Surveyor Limited 57 1,810
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 68 2,160

















DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 3700 2,502 4496.0 3040.8
Midland 3800 2,570
Treasure Land Property Consultants 4900 3,314
Dudley Surveyor Limited 4730 3,199
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 5350 3,618
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Chung sik seem 410 2,246 416.7 2282.4
Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 420 2,301
Tony T N Chan Surveyors Ltd 420 2,301
















Chung sik seem 17.5 7,855 19.2 8602.6
Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 18 8,079
Tony T N Chan Surveyors Ltd 22 9,874
















FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 294 1,181 309.0 1240.9
Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 265 1,064
Tony T N Chan Surveyors Ltd 340 1,365
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 370 1,486
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 300 1,205
Centaline 300 1,205
RHL International Gp 294 1,181
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 295 1,185
Chungsen Property GP 323 1,297
Appendix
Page | 168















Centaline 50 2,790 56.3 3139.5
Tony T N Chan Surveyors Ltd 55 3,069
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 55 3,069
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 70 3,906
Chungsen Property GP 53.8 3,002



















Tony T N Chan Surveyors Ltd 270 3,798 203.5 2862.9
Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 213 2,996
RHL International gp 200 2,814
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 180 2,532
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 180 2,532
Chungsen Property GP 178 2,504















Tony T N Chan Surveyors Ltd 190 15,165 177.0 14127.2
Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 150 11,972
RHL International gp 188 15,005
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 170 13,569
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 165 13,169
Chungsen Property GP 188 15,005
Fortune realty 188 15,005















midland 1450 7,000 1225.7 5802.1
Fortune realty 1230 5,800
RICACORP Prop 1310 6,200
RHL International gp 1080 5,092
Chungsen Property GP 1150 5,423



















Midland 9100 3,650 9664.3 3696.4
Fortune realty 8760 3,500
RICACORP Prop 8250 3,300
Centaline 7800 3,000
RHL International gp 8740 3,525
Chungsen Property GP 12500 4,450
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 12500 4,450















FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 21.5 2,229 25.0 2592.3
DTZ 28 2,903
RICACORP Prop 17.5 1,815
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 30 3,111
Cheung Hoi Tat 28 2,903
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 25 2,592















FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 5380 7,500 4822.9 6728.7
DTZ 4600 6,400
RICACORP Prop 5000 7,000
HK property 5380 7,500
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 4600 6,415
Cheung Hoi Tat 4400 6,136
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 4400 6,150
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FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 6430 14,992 6494.3 15142.2
DTZ 6700 15,622
RICACORP Prop 6800 15,855
hk property 6430 14,992
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 7000 16,321
Cheung Hoi Tat 5900 13,757
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 6200 14,456















FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 50 9,000 43.8 7800.0
RICACORP Prop 56 10,000
centaline 40 7,000
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 28 5,000
Chungsen Property GP 45 8,000















FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 40 1,580 50.4 1990.8
RICACORP Prop 100 3,950
centaline 36 1,422
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 38 1,501
Chungsen Property GP 38 1,501
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midland 4300 12,598 4530.0 13271.8
Fortune realty 4100 12,012
RICACORP Prop 4500 13,184
HK property 5120 15,000
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 5000 14,649
Chungsen Property GP 4100 12,012
centaline 4000 11,719
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 5120 15,000















midland 40 5,918 50.3 7434.5
Chartersince 55 8,137
centaline 50 7,398
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 56 8,285















midland 145 3,977 145.0 3976.6
Chartersince 165 4,525
Centaline 125 3,428
DAVID C LEE SURVEYORS LTD 145 3,977
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Chartersince 2900 3,248 3052.0 3418.7
RICACORP Prop 3300 3,697
centaline 3400 3,809
Chungsen Property GP 2860 3,204
















Lanbase Surveyors Ltd 5600 4,810 6316.7 5426.0
Fortune Realty 7000 6,013
RICACORP Prop 7000 6,013
Centaline 7000 6,013
Chartersince 4800 4,123
Chungsen Property GP 6500 5,583















Chartersince 187 2,785 215.2 3204.8
RICACORP Prop 200 2,978
Chi Cheung 216 3,217
Surpass Company Ltd 238 3,544
Chungsen Property GP 235 3,500
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RICACORP Prop 160 6,215 192.8 7488.8
Chi Cheung 160 6,215
Chartersince 200 7,768
Surpass Company Ltd 214 8,312
Chungsen Property GP 230 8,934















midland 47.5 2,263 45.8 2183.3
centaline 46 2,191
Chi Cheung 52.5 2,501
Chartersince 45 2,144
LCH (Asia-Pacific) Surveyors Ltd 42 2,001
Richland property 42 2,001















midland 330 2,444 326.3 2417.1
centaline 338 2,504
Chi Cheung 360 2,666
Chartersince 320 2,370
LCH (Asia-Pacific) Surveyors 310 2,296
















Chungsen Property GP 30 1,366 36.7 1670.0
RHL International gp 33 1,503
centaline 33 1,503
Midland 47 2,141
Fortune Realty 51 2,323
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 26 1,184









sq. ft. Land price
Price per
sq ft.
Chungsen Property GP 350 1,635 367.8 1718.5
RHL International gp 280 1,308
centaline 397 1,855
Midland 350 1,635
Fortune Realty 430 2,009
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 400 1,869















Midland 8.5 2,127 8.7 2166.2
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 7.25 1,814
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 9.5 2,377
Chi Cheung 8.2 2,052
RICACORP Prop 10.5 2,627
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 8 2,002
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Midland 65 3,700 74.0 4212.2
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 75 4,269
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 66 3,757
Chi Cheung 105 5,977
RICACORP Prop 75 4,269
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 58 3,301















Fortune Realty 300 1,367 258.4 1177.6
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 240 1,094
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 300 1,367
Chi Cheung 260 1,185
Chartersince 260 1,185
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 189 861
DTZ 260 1,185












Fortune Realty 1000 8,251 838.6 6919.0
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 785 6,477
RICACORP Prop 610 5,033
Chi Cheung 1000 8,251
Chartersince 1000 8,251
















Chartersince 360 1,817 287.9 1452.9
FRANCIS LAU & CO LTD 383 1,933
Chi Cheung 295 1,489
Fortune Realty 234 1,181
Midland 250 1,262
Centaline 271 1,368
Chungsen Property GP 270 1,363


















Chartersince 411 3,000 440.3 3213.5
Centaline 456 3,328
Chungsen Property GP 414 3,022
Midland 480 3,504














Midland 550 4,097 447.0 3329.8
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 335 2,495
Centaline 456 3,397














Midland 400 1,480 405.2 1499.0
Surpass Company Ltd 486 1,798
Chungsen Property GP 380 1,406


















Chungsen Property GP 33.5 2,483 35.9 2658.5
Centaline 37 2,743
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 28.2 2,090
Midland 35 2,595
RICACORP Prop 37.6 2,787
Chi Cheung Investment Ltd 40 2,965
Morgan Stanley 44.7 3,314
Sun Hung Kai Securities 30.9 2,291















Chungsen Property GP 466 2,112 448.9 2034.0
Centaline 430 1,949
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 417 1,890
Midland 450 2,039
Chi Cheung Investment Ltd 430 1,949
Morgan Stanley 532 2,411
Sun Hung Kai Securities 417 1,890














Chungsen Property GP 258 7,990 238.8 7395.8
Centaline 230 7,123
COLLIERS JARDINE LTD 226 6,999
Midland 226 6,999
RICACORP Prop 226 6,999
Chi Cheung Investment Ltd 245 7,587
Morgan Stanley 251 7,773
Sun Hung Kai Securities 248.6 7,699
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Chungsen Property GP 9 981 9.4 1029.3
Midland 10 1,090
Centaline 9.2 1,003
HK property Ltd 9 981
Chi Cheung Investment Ltd 10 1,090














Chungsen Property GP 395 1,580 323.8 1295.2
Midland 320 1,280
Fortune Realty 308 1,232
HK property Ltd 300 1,200
Chi Cheung Investment Ltd 296 1,184
















Chungsen Property GP 395 1,667 323.8 1366.3
Midland 320 1,350
Fortune Realty 308 1,300
HK property Ltd 300 1,266
Chi Cheung Investment Ltd 296 1,249
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Centaline 132 9,962 117.2 8842.1
Chungsen Property GP 126 9,509
Midland 110 8,301
Fortune Realty 125 9,433
HK property Ltd 100 7,547
Chi Cheung Investment Ltd 110 8,301














SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 640 798 654.2 815.7
Centaline 600 748
Chungsen Property GP 600 748
Midland 800 998
Fortune Realty 565 705
RICACORP Prop 720 898














Chartersince 175 7,969 188.0 8561.4
Centaline 180 8,197
Chungsen Property GP 200 9,108
Midland 165 7,514
Fortune Realty 208 9,472
B I APPRAISALS LTD 200 9,108
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Midland 145 1,498 157.2 1624.3
Surpass Company Ltd 168 1,736
Chungsen Property GP 145 1,498
Chartersince 168 1,736
RICACORP Prop 160 1,653
















Chartersince 1250 2,212 1302.4 2305.0
Centaline 1289 2,281
Chungsen Property GP 1150 2,035
Midland 1330 2,354
Fortune Realty 1400 2,478
Surpass Company Ltd 1400 2,478
Knight Frank 1150 2,035


















Midland 8 550 10 721
RICACORP Prop 12 797
Fortune Realty 12 800
Centaline 13 893
Treasure Land Property 8 563














Midland 176 2,320 149.0 1964.5
RICACORP Prop 150 1,978
Fortune Realty 144 1,899
Centaline 120 1,582
Treasure Land Property 155 2,044














Midland 480 8,182 490.7 8364.7
RICACORP Prop 500 8,523
Fortune Realty 469 7,995
Vigers 430 7,330
Chungsen Property GP 500 8,523
Centaline 528 9,000
Treasureland property Ltd 528 9,000
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Midland 130 6,973 146.7 7866.7
Surpass Company Ltd 150 8,045
Centaline 140 7,509
RICACORP Prop 180 9,655
Chartersince 150 8,045
Treasureland property Ltd 130 6,973
JUNCTION OF HING WAH STREET WEST &
















Midland 2490 1600 2782 1788
RICACORP Prop 2800 1799
Centaline 2950 1896

















Fortune Realty 75 758 88.0 888.9
Centaline 80 808
Midland 85 859
Merrill Lynch 70 707
Knight Frank 118 1,192
Treasureland property Ltd 94 949
RICACORP Prop 94 949
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JUNCTION OF CARMEL VILLAGE STREET AND














Centaline 220 1,599 240.3 1746.4
Midland 230 1,671
Merrill Lynch 250 1,817
Knight Frank 275 1,998
Treasureland property Ltd 220 1,599
RICACORP Prop 247 1,795
















Midland 260 1,152 246.5 1091.9
RICACORP Prop 260 1,152
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 240 1,063
Fortune Realty 247 1,094
Centaline 225 997
Treasureland property Ltd 247 1,094














Midland 630 1,029 674.8 1101.7
RICACORP Prop 735 1,200
Surpass Company Ltd 600 980
Fortune Realty 734 1,198
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Chartersince 235 1,325 223.1 1258.2
Centaline 230 1,297
Chungsen Property GP 200 1,128
Midland 230 1,297
Fortune Realty 177 998
Surpass Company Ltd 235 1,325
Treasureland property Ltd 230 1,297
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 248 1,398















SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 400 1,493 447.5 1669.8
Centaline 470 1,754
Chungsen Property GP 480 1,791
Midland 480 1,791
RICACORP Prop 429 1,601
Fortune Realty 428 1,597
Surpass Company Ltd 463 1,728
Treasureland property Ltd 430 1,604













Chartersince 950 1,148 994.9 1202.0
Centaline 1030 1,244
Chungsen Property GP 910 1,099
Midland 1000 1,208
RICACORP Prop 1159 1,400
Fortune Realty 910 1,099
Surpass Company Ltd 1000 1,208
Treasureland property Ltd 1000 1,208
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Midland 16.8 1,400 18.9 1571.7
RICACORP Prop 18 1,500
Centaline 17.5 1,458
Fortune Realty 24 2,000
Chungsen Property GP 18 1,500
















Midland 2600 17,162 2895.8 19114.4
RICACORP Prop 2935 19,373
Treasureland property Ltd 2800 18,482
Centaline 3300 21,782
Fortune Realty 2800 18,482


















Midland 59 1,422 58.8 1417.7
RICACORP Prop 63 1,518
Treasureland property Ltd 50 1,205
Centaline 65 1,566
Fortune Realty 58 1,398
Chartersince 58 1,398

















Midland 490 1,247 495.0 1259.9
RICACORP Prop 490 1,247
Treasureland property Ltd 500 1,273
Centaline 470 1,196
Fortune Realty 510 1,298
BROOKE INSIGNIA 510 1,298














Midland 38 1,647 33.5 1451.6
RICACORP Prop 30 1,300




J/O LOK HA SQUARE, LOK LIN PATH, AREA














Midland 32 1,097 39.8 1365.6
RICACORP Prop 48 1,646
Fortune Realty 40 1,371
Treasureland property Ltd 40 1,371
Centaline 41 1,406
Vigers 38 1,303















Midland 55 763 49.0 679.6
RICACORP Prop 47 652
Fortune Realty 43 596
Treasureland property Ltd 54 749
Centaline 55 763
Chungsen Property GP 40 555














Midland 150 1,304 193.3 1680.4
RICACORP Prop 219 1,904
Centaline 184 1,600
Chungsen Property Gp. 220 1,913
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Midland 21 1,050 23.0 1150.0
RICACORP Prop 21 1,050
Fortune Realty 25 1,250
Vigers 23 1,150
Surpass Company Ltd 26 1,300
Centaline 24 1,200
Asia Pacific Property Ltd 21 1,050
















Midland 108 1,403 86.9 1128.8
RICACORP Prop 79 1,026
Fortune Realty 93 1,208
Vigers 82 1,065
Surpass Company Ltd 90 1,169
Centaline 69.5 903
OFF PING CHUK LANE, PING SHAN, YUEN














Chungsen Property GP 59 551 63.2 590.7
Centaline 64 598
Midland 59 551
RICACORP Prop 64 598
Fortune Realty 70 654
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Centaline 120 1,446 116.4 7334.2
Chungsen Property GP 108 1,301
Midland 121 1,458
RICACORP Prop 125 1,506



















A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 245 645 237.8 625.8
Centaline 245 645
Midland 236 621
Fortune Realty 200 526
Asia Pacific Property Ltd 263 692
















Centaline 41 1,512 37.7 1389.9
Midland 33.9 1,250
Fortune Realty 30 1,106
RICACORP Prop 45.9 1,692














Centaline 100 3,333 103.6 3453.3
Midland 90 3,000
RICACORP Prop 110 3,667
Asia Pacific Property Ltd 93 3,100
A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 125 4,167
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Chartersince 600 1,375 570.0 1306.5
Centaline 570 1,307
Midland 570 1,307
RICACORP Prop 530 1,215
Asia Pacific Property Ltd 550 1,261
A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 600 1,375
JUNCTION OF CORNWALL STREET AND TAT














Centaline 600 1,992 567.3 1883.7
Midland 510 1,693
RICACORP Prop 542 1,800
Fortune Realty 660 2,191
Asia Pacific Property Ltd 530 1,760
UBS 562 1,866
















A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 1500 1,786 1311.8 1561.7
Centaline 1260 1,500
Surpass Company Ltd 1200 1,429
Midland 1270 1,512
RICACORP Prop 1520 1,810
Fortune Realty 1170 1,393
Asia Pacific Property Ltd 1200 1,429
Morgan Stanley 1270 1,512





















Chartersince 130 1,532 121.0 1426.4
Centaline 130 1,532
Chungsen Property GP 127 1,497
Midland 122 1,438
RICACORP Prop 118 1,391
Fortune Realty 110 1,297
A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 110 1,297
















Centaline 270 1,690 280.0 1752.4
Chungsen Property GP 285 1,784
Midland 290 1,815
RICACORP Prop 300 1,878
Fortune Realty 285 1,784
A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 260 1,627
Chartersince 270 1,690














Centaline 270 1,210 279.1 1250.5
Chungsen Property GP 305 1,366
Midland 270 1,210
Fortune Realty 280 1,254
A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 280 1,254
CBRE 230 1,030
Calyon Securities 319 1,429
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Chartersince 83 1,069 77.9 1003.5
Centaline 80 1,031
Chungsen Property GP 86 1,108
Midland 75 966
RICACORP Prop 73 940
Fortune Realty 81 1,044
A.G. Wilkinson and Associates 77 992
CBRE 73 940























Vigers 1390 1,846 1457 1935
Centaline 1510 2,005
Knight Frank 1510 2,005
Midland 1357 1,802
Ricacorp Prop 1440 1,912
Legend Surveyors 1480 1,965
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 1510 2,005














Vigers 530 2,032 558 2139
Centaline 575 2,205
Knight Frank 520 1,994
Midland 550 2,109
Ricacorp Prop 600 2,301
Legend Surveyors 560 2,147
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 570 2,186













Centaline 975 2,858 983 2,881
Midland 1,100 3,225
Ricacorp Prop 887 2,600
Vigers 1,000 2,932
Knight Frank 1,050 3,078
Chungsen Prop. Limited 885 2,595
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Associates 7000 4,070 6757 3928
Centaline 7220 4,198
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 6000 3,488
Knight Frank 6900 4,012
Midland 6800 3,953
Ricacorp Prop 7750 4,506
UBS 5509 3,203
BNP Paris 6800 3,953
Meryil lynch 6980 4,058
Legend Surveyors Ltd 7100 4,128
Chartersince Property 6520 3,791
Chungsen Prop. Limited 6500 3,779
JUNCTION OF KING FUK STREET, KING TAI
STREET AND PRINCE EDWARD ROAD EAST,














Associates 3800 3,089 3877 3152
Centaline 4180 3,398
SK Pang Surveyors Co.&Ltd 3700 3,008
Knight Frank 4100 3,333
Midland 4500 3,658
Ricacorp Prop 4500 3,658
UBS 3084 2,507
BNP Paris 4100 3,333
Meryil lynch 3820 3,106
Legend Surveyors Ltd 3600 2,927
Chartersince Property 3740 3,041
Chungsen Prop. Limited 3400 2,764
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Appendix 7. Data for market return model
Site no. Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6
1 0.176% -0.202% 0.155% 1.079% 4.560% 2.706%
2 0.239% -2.922% -3.803% 6.616% 0.390% 1.771%
3 -11.660% -19.880% -16.994% -12.009% -9.348% -7.130%
4 -0.244% 2.787% 1.091% -0.607% -3.532% -7.563%
5 -0.436% -7.559% 9.053% -4.573% 2.268% 0.107%
6 2.129% 8.684% 4.632% 6.666% -0.391% 5.383%
7 -0.436% -7.559% 9.053% -4.573% 2.268% 0.107%
8 -0.931% 5.317% 0.737% 2.254% 4.570% 5.430%
9 -2.955% -3.556% -0.129% -2.376% -0.542% 1.388%
10 2.129% 8.684% 4.632% 6.666% -0.391% 5.383%
11 7.423% 20.679% 18.802% 14.216% 11.861% 13.667%
12 -0.931% 5.317% 0.737% 2.254% 4.570% 5.430%
13 -4.041% -3.824% -5.141% -4.656% -5.639% -3.388%
14 -0.936% -0.438% 0.624% -0.045% 0.794% -1.257%
15 0.485% -0.498% 1.753% 1.365% -1.282% 2.018%
16 1.279% -0.254% 2.811% 5.676% 2.215% 2.864%
17 2.524% 4.069% 3.390% 2.244% 4.049% 4.280%
18 -1.935% 2.296% 5.072% 1.272% 2.539% 5.485%
19 -0.611% -5.442% -8.199% -1.315% -2.243% -1.083%
20 1.485% 0.871% 1.819% 1.056% 2.015% 0.953%
21 0.616% -2.785% -1.205% -1.351% -6.282% -0.082%
22 -0.671% 0.117% -1.776% -1.854% -1.377% 0.052%
23 -2.119% -2.165% 5.313% 7.180% 12.505% 18.387%
24 6.200% 2.219% 4.230% 3.416% -0.143% -0.989%
25 2.618% 4.296% 6.004% 8.283% 7.113% 8.442%
26 1.023% 3.058% 4.767% 4.778% 5.399% 8.226%
27 7.958% 4.764% -2.936% -2.113% 0.915% 5.380%
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28 2.177% 3.798% 6.154% 5.876% 4.630% 5.026%
29 0.082% 0.817% -2.125% 3.425% 1.621% 0.850%
30 -0.627% 0.039% -1.195% 1.658% -2.381% -1.279%
31 0.502% 0.125% 0.050% -5.451% -15.289% -14.238%
32 -1.002% -1.069% 0.453% -1.930% -5.527% -5.998%
33 1.855% 1.640% 4.014% -1.905% 12.667% 0.521%
34 1.320% -0.424% -13.579% -16.434% -19.830% -18.590%
35 2.374% -3.545% 11.027% -1.119% 4.495% -5.136%
36 0.210% 0.671% 0.827% 1.396% -0.519% 2.315%
37 0.137% -3.294% 0.246% -3.423% 1.206% 0.497%
38 5.064% 3.295% 10.623% -4.363% -9.230% 6.799%
39 -0.971% 0.549% 5.413% 2.770% 1.365% 1.540%
40 1.989% 0.296% 0.237% -0.662% -2.712% -2.731%
41 1.050% -5.472% -2.009% 0.303% 2.868% -1.758%
42 -0.471% 2.451% 0.359% 0.929% -0.067% 3.399%
43 -0.060% -0.958% -3.009% -3.028% -3.829% -1.924%
44 0.061% -2.399% 1.566% -2.029% -1.915% -1.908%
45 -0.899% -2.949% -2.968% -3.769% -1.865% -1.639%
46 -2.460% 1.505% -2.091% -1.977% -1.969% -1.000%
47 -0.395% 1.424% -0.082% -3.179% -3.666% -3.406%
48 -0.395% 1.424% -0.082% -3.179% -3.666% -3.406%
49 2.694% 5.534% 0.225% 0.087% -1.853% -0.340%
50 -3.596% -3.482% -3.474% -2.506% -0.617% 0.298%
51 -0.853% 2.695% -0.219% 1.972% 7.737% 9.735%
52 -1.203% 1.571% -2.383% 2.321% 4.542% -0.716%
53 -2.965% -1.511% -4.778% 5.605% -12.159% 8.185%
54 -0.168% -1.970% -2.212% -2.736% -4.382% -4.968%
55 6.323% -0.375% -0.844% 2.038% 2.703% 2.741%
56 -7.899% -8.982% -4.760% -5.158% -5.077% -15.324%
57 1.092% 1.935% 2.854% 3.195% 1.731% 2.208%
58 -0.469% 2.413% 3.078% 3.116% 6.190% 7.261%
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59 -1.645% -2.232% -1.684% -0.286% -0.090% -0.297%
60 -1.645% -2.232% -1.684% -0.286% -0.090% -0.297%
61 3.907% -4.700% 8.122% 7.842% 2.949% 0.683%
62 0.823% 0.695% 1.058% 1.982% 2.183% 2.767%
63 -3.791% -2.004% -1.863% 12.037% 24.953% -9.408%
64 3.718% -1.568% 6.657% 1.695% 4.201% 0.087%
65 1.397% -1.550% 0.430% 2.208% 0.440% -4.565%
66 -3.319% 1.288% -6.063% 3.815% 0.831% -2.348%
67 4.823% 1.666% -0.607% 3.633% -0.956% -0.540%
68 5.525% 11.084% -2.778% 9.457% 0.154% 0.820%
69 -1.020% -2.544% -0.688% 3.384% 0.621% 0.888%
70 20.066% 12.975% 19.145% 10.415% -18.516% 19.899%
71 -2.941% 1.984% 10.378% 5.563% -5.960% 6.751%
72 -0.592% -0.747% -5.918% 0.221% -7.896% -5.491%
73 2.791% 1.954% 2.030% 2.587% 3.335% 2.153%
74 -2.186% -2.169% -1.983% -2.088% -4.854% -2.807%
75 0.185% 0.080% -2.686% -0.639% 1.135% 5.148%
76 5.411% 5.858% 6.662% -2.023% 2.204% 7.034%
77 0.185% 0.080% -2.686% -0.639% 1.135% 5.148%
78 1.272% 1.311% -1.420% -0.293% -10.742% -4.980%
79 5.887% -2.702% -15.490% -4.144% -26.895% -17.143%
80 -2.411% -3.771% -2.445% 0.415% -3.706% -2.528%
81 -12.788% -1.442% -24.193% -14.441% -2.141% -11.825%
82 2.187% 2.494% 1.247% 1.690% 4.703% 1.506%
83 -2.508% 0.777% -3.380% 1.672% -2.005% 1.469%
84 -9.791% 0.481% -1.542% 5.101% 6.489% 11.481%
85 -0.423% -5.300% -3.377% -2.019% 2.549% -0.068%
86 -3.478% -5.347% 5.952% -0.572% 0.148% 2.930%
87 -2.023% 4.620% 6.008% 11.000% 14.407% 9.256%
88 11.298% 4.775% 5.495% 8.276% 14.683% 8.599%
89 4.567% 1.951% 3.419% 1.470% -2.039% 0.943%
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90 -1.499% -4.185% 0.383% -1.090% 0.472% 0.235%
91 -8.745% -5.390% -3.322% -1.534% 0.999% 2.961%
92 -10.645% -0.835% -6.148% -0.680% -3.023% -4.900%
93 10.523% 3.675% 27.395% -1.615% 5.665% 19.417%
94 -0.245% 0.155% -0.172% -3.221% -1.439% -0.315%
95 1.405% -7.073% 12.345% 10.568% -0.636% 4.543%
96 1.680% -3.612% 1.406% -4.533% -2.880% -5.768%
97 -0.326% -3.376% -1.594% -0.470% -0.957% 0.732%
98 -0.090% 2.334% -2.773% 2.408% -3.109% -1.773%
99 7.191% 3.904% 0.897% -4.336% -2.503% -2.938%
100 3.899% 0.868% 5.655% -4.298% 0.398% -0.104%
101 -2.857% 0.246% 1.895% 1.141% 1.128% 1.794%
102 2.279% -3.178% -1.345% -4.849% -2.569% -5.029%
103 -1.605% 7.651% 7.466% 2.692% 0.568% 1.680%
104 2.460% 8.160% -12.077% -9.108% -13.480% -13.792%
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Appendix 8. Data for mean return model
Site no. DC31 DC32 DC33 DC34 DC35 DC36
DC31 DC32 DC33 DC34 DC35 DC36
1 -1.077% 2.368% 2.620% 2.840% 1.732% 1.822%
2 9.090% 6.785% 5.865% 7.497% 5.297% 5.142%
3 -10.302% -9.419% -6.010% -4.226% -3.912% -3.310%
4 1.557% 2.312% 0.396% -0.928% -1.408% -2.281%
5 1.836% -1.603% 2.243% -0.815% 0.758% 0.290%
6 4.147% 5.478% 1.793% 1.108% -0.563% 0.094%
7 1.836% -1.603% 2.243% -0.815% 0.758% 0.290%
8 -1.180% 2.313% -3.050% -1.631% -1.304% -1.345%
9 1.942% 3.023% 1.808% 2.359% 2.821% 3.129%
10 4.147% 5.478% 1.793% 1.108% -0.563% 0.094%
11 14.478% 17.298% 10.275% 8.664% 7.458% 7.332%
12 -1.180% 2.313% -3.050% -1.631% -1.304% -1.345%
13 -0.802% -0.385% -0.790% -1.068% -0.304% 0.257%
14 -1.125% -0.277% -0.336% -0.749% 0.249% 0.626%
15 -1.111% 1.213% 2.094% 1.929% 2.067% 3.253%
16 5.592% 3.357% 4.581% 5.559% 4.659% 4.652%
17 3.726% 3.345% 3.625% 3.803% 4.176% 4.192%
18 -0.232% 3.506% 4.822% 3.559% 3.704% 3.929%
19 1.951% 0.495% 1.256% 3.770% 3.605% 3.692%
20 1.314% 1.091% 0.716% 0.528% 0.380% 0.189%
21 0.471% -1.448% -1.048% -1.102% -2.067% -0.793%
22 -0.511% -0.058% -1.102% -1.391% -1.460% -1.059%
23 -3.329% -2.127% 1.394% 2.159% 3.150% 3.749%
24 8.056% 2.931% 3.901% 4.003% 3.823% 4.055%
25 5.530% 5.830% 5.739% 6.717% 5.567% 4.728%
26 3.329% 4.331% 5.055% 3.560% 3.569% 4.030%
27 2.159% -3.010% -7.519% -7.233% -5.926% -5.940%
28 1.933% 3.416% 2.410% 0.516% 0.129% -1.037%
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29 -3.787% -1.500% -1.789% -1.326% -2.239% -2.421%
30 -5.488% -4.022% -3.010% -3.170% -4.531% -4.255%
31 -2.953% -3.109% -2.407% -3.569% -7.123% -7.222%
32 -6.090% -4.922% -3.496% -3.840% -5.923% -6.491%
33 -3.527% -4.471% -3.463% -4.735% -3.270% -6.508%
34 0.230% -1.614% -9.348% -9.958% -10.772% -10.282%
35 -0.351% -3.904% -1.376% -6.432% -7.204% -8.897%
36 -0.867% -0.148% -3.128% -4.156% -6.560% -6.008%
37 1.063% -5.694% -4.713% -6.451% -5.520% -4.345%
38 8.303% 0.210% 1.023% -5.762% -6.174% -1.558%
39 -9.399% -7.435% -7.817% -7.840% -5.917% -5.846%
40 -5.634% -6.756% -8.736% -7.892% -5.926% -5.751%
41 2.078% -2.559% -0.255% 2.776% 3.848% 2.530%
42 -2.735% -3.876% -3.756% -1.354% -1.723% -1.267%
43 -8.402% -4.734% -1.079% -0.955% -1.213% -2.040%
44 -8.559% -5.733% 0.168% -0.983% -1.108% -2.315%
45 3.375% 7.025% 5.969% 5.026% 3.674% 3.951%
46 2.407% 9.845% 6.856% 6.068% 4.247% 4.651%
47 10.859% 7.543% 5.035% 1.726% 2.011% 2.549%
48 10.859% 7.543% 5.035% 1.726% 2.011% 2.549%
49 7.781% 5.353% -0.773% -0.376% -0.272% -0.053%
50 -4.605% -3.192% -4.966% -3.428% -2.052% -1.920%
51 -5.244% -6.359% -5.970% -4.164% -3.114% -2.742%
52 -1.792% -0.162% -1.847% -0.535% -1.086% -2.267%
53 0.486% 1.104% 0.417% 2.869% -1.933% 1.534%
54 1.419% -0.301% -0.548% -0.802% -1.405% -2.027%
55 4.775% -1.756% -3.260% -2.524% -2.608% -1.860%
56 -13.001% -9.714% -7.227% -7.733% -7.516% -8.253%
57 -0.155% -0.400% -0.834% -1.789% -2.299% -1.475%
58 -5.500% -2.526% -2.409% -1.146% -0.428% 0.006%
59 -2.274% -2.934% -2.068% -0.163% 0.476% 0.721%
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60 -2.274% -2.934% -2.068% -0.163% 0.476% 0.721%
61 0.699% -6.747% -1.378% -0.710% -1.496% -1.695%
62 1.695% 3.738% 4.143% 4.316% 3.766% 3.518%
63 -6.013% -0.500% -0.291% 3.687% 5.456% -0.983%
64 7.992% 4.055% 5.681% 3.053% 2.928% 1.240%
65 4.357% 1.847% 1.804% 1.813% 0.543% -1.020%
66 -6.741% -1.996% -6.452% -4.710% -4.546% -4.381%
67 6.203% 2.995% 0.168% 0.046% -0.102% 0.722%
68 4.568% 4.747% -2.610% -0.029% -1.639% -0.828%
69 -2.988% -4.747% -2.400% -0.618% -0.770% -0.377%
70 16.765% 2.513% 5.001% 2.654% -3.288% 3.950%
71 0.454% 4.497% 7.244% 5.299% 1.439% 4.105%
72 2.768% 3.653% 2.419% 4.593% 1.614% 1.931%
73 6.970% 5.082% 2.370% 1.959% 1.855% 1.443%
74 1.060% 2.088% 0.100% -0.143% -0.716% -0.316%
75 -6.790% -5.287% -5.499% -4.431% -2.876% -1.938%
76 1.974% 3.092% 2.180% 0.125% 2.080% 2.825%
77 -6.790% -5.287% -5.499% -4.431% -2.876% -1.938%
78 -0.099% 0.830% 1.227% 1.402% -1.126% 0.034%
79 3.060% -4.238% -6.454% -2.238% -6.927% -4.098%
80 -3.034% -2.570% 0.097% 1.105% -0.086% 0.541%
81 -7.013% 3.635% -4.846% -0.155% 2.377% 0.588%
82 -0.202% -0.583% -1.192% -1.242% -0.801% -1.314%
83 -5.484% -2.027% -3.320% -1.833% -2.729% -1.906%
84 -14.380% -4.686% -5.624% -3.584% -2.688% -2.091%
85 -0.702% -3.267% -1.926% -1.054% 0.834% 0.294%
86 -7.985% -3.533% 1.193% -0.918% -0.619% 0.101%
87 0.417% 5.436% 6.561% 7.124% 7.084% 5.698%
88 17.152% 8.202% 7.829% 8.423% 9.078% 8.127%
89 9.555% 4.161% 3.623% 2.601% 1.751% 2.481%
90 3.634% 1.239% 2.756% 2.106% 2.398% 2.508%
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91 -11.786% -5.534% -3.753% -2.611% -1.965% -2.310%
92 -11.453% 0.857% -2.085% -1.107% -1.502% -1.561%
93 11.386% 4.783% 10.768% 0.330% 1.907% 4.163%
94 0.252% 1.217% 0.982% -0.836% -0.956% -0.834%
95 0.984% -3.374% 3.359% 2.032% -1.071% -0.808%
96 -0.674% -2.947% -0.972% -3.323% -2.087% -2.447%
97 -0.464% -3.866% -3.381% -2.837% -2.776% -1.693%
98 2.829% 4.249% 2.688% 2.854% 2.205% 2.622%
99 3.747% 1.325% -0.241% -0.712% -0.460% -0.417%
100 -2.012% -2.961% -1.397% -4.124% -1.913% -2.093%
101 -7.952% -2.456% -1.834% -1.948% -0.951% -0.961%
102 -1.396% -2.979% -0.901% -0.687% 0.214% -0.089%
103 -0.768% 4.323% 2.725% 0.636% 0.632% 1.226%
104 5.792% 7.073% -1.294% 0.182% 0.318% 1.143%
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Appendix 9. Data for modified mean return model
Site no. DY31 DY32 DY33 Dy34 Dy35 DY36
DY31 DY32 DY33 Dy34 Dy35 DY36
1 0.363% 0.086% 0.239% 0.457% 1.099% 0.638%
2 1.900% 0.200% 0.393% 3.315% 1.739% 1.956%
3 -16.062% -14.343% -10.067% -7.405% -6.272% -5.591%
4 -0.887% 0.750% -0.280% -0.796% -1.350% -1.904%
5 0.943% -2.400% 4.397% 0.237% 1.833% 1.398%
6 1.702% 3.915% 1.117% 1.240% -0.505% 0.470%
7 0.943% -2.400% 4.397% 0.237% 1.833% 1.398%
8 -2.073% 1.516% -0.896% -0.579% -0.228% -0.237%
9 1.050% 2.227% 3.962% 3.411% 3.896% 4.236%
10 1.702% 3.915% 1.117% 1.240% -0.505% 0.470%
11 13.585% 16.502% 12.429% 9.716% 8.534% 8.440%
12 -2.073% 1.516% -0.896% -0.579% -0.228% -0.237%
13 -5.210% -3.081% -2.883% -2.333% -2.297% -1.734%
14 0.993% 1.710% 2.138% 1.918% 2.088% 1.720%
15 2.199% 1.465% 2.298% 2.055% 1.457% 2.050%
16 1.215% -0.191% 0.872% 1.354% 0.379% 0.413%
17 3.265% 2.776% 1.872% 1.303% 1.551% 1.455%
18 -0.923% 2.160% 2.703% 1.330% 1.520% 1.926%
19 1.259% -0.851% -0.863% 1.541% 1.421% 1.689%
20 1.886% 0.837% 1.008% 0.666% 0.804% 0.560%
21 0.528% -1.481% -0.490% -0.426% -1.345% -0.102%
22 -0.949% -0.220% -0.870% -0.742% -0.554% -0.270%
23 -4.741% -3.705% -0.851% -0.828% -0.121% 0.442%
24 7.366% 2.275% 2.576% 2.020% 1.137% 1.001%
25 2.900% 2.430% 2.283% 2.353% 1.704% 1.689%
26 2.739% 3.245% 3.305% 2.911% 2.796% 3.087%
27 3.074% -2.502% -5.863% -5.412% -4.701% -3.987%
28 1.077% 0.800% 0.952% 0.370% -0.173% -0.262%
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29 0.614% 0.941% -0.176% 1.389% 0.856% 0.674%
30 -1.871% -1.224% -1.642% -0.829% -1.720% -1.457%
31 0.939% 0.499% 0.453% -0.926% -2.621% -1.936%
32 -1.684% -1.216% -0.531% -1.164% -1.787% -1.681%
33 1.395% 0.360% 0.878% -0.936% 2.073% -0.373%
34 0.143% -1.389% -5.703% -5.285% -5.143% -4.275%
35 0.509% -3.637% 1.811% -2.145% -0.966% -2.721%
36 -0.007% 0.118% 0.058% 0.132% -0.321% 0.168%
37 0.192% -1.592% 0.137% -0.801% 0.296% 0.138%
38 6.134% 2.718% 4.611% -0.021% -0.776% 2.203%
39 -1.297% -0.051% 1.478% 0.366% -0.053% -0.069%
40 2.468% 0.628% 0.559% 0.314% -0.063% 0.025%
41 6.188% 2.402% 4.468% 5.213% 5.711% 4.845%
42 1.015% 2.711% 1.606% 1.718% 1.473% 2.052%
43 0.209% -0.210% -0.734% -0.488% -0.497% -0.052%
44 0.052% -1.208% 0.513% -0.516% -0.392% -0.327%
45 -0.978% -1.553% -1.068% -1.021% -0.452% -0.352%
46 -1.945% 1.267% -0.182% 0.021% 0.121% 0.348%
47 -0.892% 0.216% -0.523% -1.291% -1.229% -1.064%
48 -0.892% 0.216% -0.523% -1.291% -1.229% -1.064%
49 5.470% 5.542% 2.850% 2.797% 2.404% 2.718%
50 -4.118% -2.263% -1.680% -1.148% -0.646% -0.472%
51 -1.281% 0.919% -0.501% 0.065% 1.119% 1.194%
52 -1.348% 0.641% -0.939% 0.436% 0.764% -0.264%
53 -1.836% 0.374% -0.463% 2.530% -1.303% 2.493%
54 0.009% -0.808% -0.561% -0.507% -0.700% -0.651%
55 6.069% -0.442% -0.536% 0.255% 0.286% 0.202%
56 -11.340% -7.932% -5.027% -4.730% -4.456% -5.995%
57 1.506% 1.382% 1.366% 1.214% 0.761% 0.783%
58 -1.279% 0.396% 0.216% -0.031% 0.428% 0.400%
59 -0.789% -0.260% 0.295% 0.785% 0.838% 0.807%
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60 -0.789% -0.260% 0.295% 0.785% 0.838% 0.807%
61 2.184% -4.073% 0.984% 0.237% -1.133% -1.609%
62 1.533% 1.058% 1.063% 1.206% 1.147% 1.172%
63 -5.935% -3.146% -2.765% 0.865% 2.847% -3.712%
64 4.895% 0.393% 3.396% 1.601% 2.018% 1.192%
65 1.612% -0.560% 0.358% 0.767% 0.303% -0.546%
66 -4.713% -0.751% -3.416% -0.441% -1.228% -1.786%
67 8.230% 4.240% 3.205% 4.316% 3.216% 3.317%
68 8.005% 8.022% 1.554% 4.844% 2.511% 2.616%
69 -0.830% -1.082% -0.039% 1.036% 0.314% 0.338%
70 22.581% 9.002% 8.897% 5.119% -1.188% 5.832%
71 -2.886% 1.047% 3.515% 1.446% -1.137% 1.180%
72 -1.332% -1.114% -2.713% -0.685% -2.319% -1.655%
73 3.734% 1.920% 1.619% 1.589% 1.609% 1.301%
74 -2.176% -1.075% -0.651% -0.512% -0.961% -0.458%
75 0.325% 0.180% -0.755% -0.020% 0.367% 0.998%
76 8.529% 6.047% 5.339% 2.612% 3.559% 4.291%
77 0.325% 0.180% -0.755% -0.020% 0.367% 0.998%
78 1.564% 0.948% -0.181% 0.219% -1.856% -0.538%
79 2.726% -4.512% -8.324% -4.197% -8.540% -6.018%
80 -3.368% -2.843% -1.773% -0.854% -1.699% -1.379%
81 -11.957% 0.110% -7.233% -2.779% 0.403% -1.140%
82 2.275% 1.335% 0.503% 0.510% 1.028% 0.339%
83 -3.006% -0.109% -1.625% -0.080% -0.899% -0.253%
84 -13.913% -3.882% -4.637% -2.848% -2.825% -2.209%
85 -0.235% -2.463% -0.938% -0.317% 0.697% 0.176%
86 -3.830% -3.025% 1.632% -0.495% -0.322% 0.136%
87 1.045% 5.378% 5.070% 5.818% 5.949% 4.610%
88 17.268% 8.358% 7.802% 8.040% 8.907% 7.404%
89 5.099% 1.507% 1.672% 0.899% 0.124% 0.689%
90 -0.822% -1.415% 0.805% 0.405% 0.771% 0.716%
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91 -10.282% -4.233% -2.645% -1.921% -1.338% -1.044%
92 -10.224% 0.003% -1.629% 0.251% -0.184% -0.396%
93 12.615% 3.930% 11.224% 1.688% 3.225% 5.328%
94 -0.294% 0.028% -0.107% -0.855% -0.337% -0.102%
95 1.496% -3.446% 4.205% 2.732% -0.037% 0.848%
96 1.899% -1.586% 0.688% -0.914% -0.356% -0.742%
97 -0.505% -1.866% -0.710% -0.296% -0.370% -0.056%
98 0.466% 1.723% -0.369% 1.158% -0.066% 0.260%
99 6.742% 1.502% -0.151% -1.534% -0.950% -0.939%
100 3.442% -0.023% 1.428% -1.531% -0.377% -0.474%
101 -2.498% 0.482% 0.991% 0.644% 0.585% 0.658%
102 2.242% -1.626% -0.485% -1.249% -0.551% -0.875%
103 -0.382% 5.049% 3.712% 1.896% 1.336% 1.503%
104 6.178% 7.798% -0.307% 1.441% 1.022% 1.420%
